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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we study the problem of secrecy-preserving query answering (SPQA)
against knowledge bases (KBs) under the open world assumption (OWA) - the assumption that
typical KBs are incomplete. Protection of secret information is a critical requirement for the
design of information systems in semantic web applications. Recently, semantic web technolo-
gies are widely used in many application domains like healthcare, bioinformatics, intelligence
and national security. So, there is a pressing need for developing robust secret protection mech-
anisms suitable for ontology-based information systems. In our work, we use a logical approach
to enforce secrecy where the domain knowledge is represented in an appropriate description
logic (DL). In particular, to protect secret information we take advantage of OWA. Under
OWA, a querying agent cannot distinguish whether a query is being protected or it cannot be
inferred from the KB. The central idea in our approach to protect the secret information is to
build a logical shield called “envelope” around the confidential information and answers queries
correctly as much as possible without compromising the secrecy.
We have chosen lightweight DL languages like DL-LiteR and ELH for studying SPQA
problem with single querying agent in the first half of this dissertation. We have considered
DL-LiteR KB with acyclic TBox and the secrecy set containing both assertional queries and
Boolean Conjunctive Queries (BCQs). By computing a suitable envelope, we protect the secrets
in the secrecy set. We have used Kleenes 3-valued semantics to prove the correctness of the
query answering procedure. We have also performed a detailed analysis of computational
complexities of various algorithms used in this dissertation. In ELH logic, we define a secrecy
set that contains both assertional and general concept inclusion queries. A new strategy has
been employed to construct the SPQA system for the given ELH KB. This includes designing
efficient query answering algorithms based on recursive decomposition of queries and have
shown that the query answering algorithms are sound and complete, thus providing correctness
vii
proof. In the second half of this dissertation, we have studied the SPQA problem in ELH♦
(ELH augmented with modal operator ♦). Given a ELH♦ KB and a finite secrecy set, we
compute a SPQA system in the form of a tree, called secrecy-preserving tree. In this case the
secrecy set contains only assertions. Since the information available in secrecy-preserving tree
is not sufficient to answer all the queries, we further augment the query answering procedure
with a recursive procedure. The recursive procedure is based on th idea of breaking the query
into smaller assertions all the way until the information in the secrecy-preserving tree can be
used.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth in online banking activities, social networks, web based travel services
and other internet based business and homeland security applications contain massive amounts
of private data of users, administrators, service providers and governmental agencies. This con-
tributes, on one hand, to unprecedented levels of data sharing and, on the other hand, to grave
concerns about privacy and confidentiality of communication between WWW users. It will
be an indispensable aspect of future web based service industry that private data while being
shared must remain inviolate. In these applications, automated reasoning plays a central role
in processing a large volume of data in an automated way for (a) storing data in a particular
format; and (b) protecting the private data and sharing the public data. Automated reasoning
(Knowledge representation and reasoning) is a branch of artificial intelligence that is concerned
with representing knowledge in some well known logical languages and manipulating the rep-
resented knowledge, by reasoning, to generate new knowledge Brachman et al. (1992); Fagin
et al. (2003). One of the crucial tasks in automated reasoning is selecting a suitable logical lan-
guage that has nice modeling and computability properties to represent the domain knowledge.
The well known logical languages like propositional logic and first order logic (FOL) are not
good candidates to represent knowledge for the many application domains because they lack
either good modeling or efficient computability properties. In order to represent the domain
knowledge for wide range of applications and to study the reasoning tasks efficiently, a family
of formal languages called description logics have been considered, see Baader (2003); Hitzler
et al. (2009); Calvanese et al. (2007).
21.1 Description Logics
Description Logics (DLs) Baader (2003) are a decidable fragments of FOL. DLs are a family
of logic based knowledge representation formal languages which have an adequate modeling and
good computability properties. That is, DLs have the reasonable balance between expressivity
and efficiency of reasoning. Further, DLs are considered to be underlying logics of Web Ontology
Languages (OWLs) Kro¨tzsch (2012) which are recommended by the WWW consortium (W3C)
as a knowledge representation languages for the web.
Generally, DLs have been classified based on their expressivity and computational complex-
ity of reasoning tasks Hitzler et al. (2009); Ortiz and Sˇimkus (2012); Kro¨tzsch (2012). There
are expressive DLs and lightweight DLs. Expressive DLs are very expressive, and the complex-
ity of the reasoning tasks in these DLs tends to be high. The prototypical ALC language and
its extensions are examples of expressive DLs. On the other hand, lightweight DLs have been
designed to have limited expressive power in order to achieve lower computational complexity
for the reasoning tasks. The important and widely used lightweight DLs are DL-LiteR, EL,
ELH, EL+ and their extensions.
In this dissertation, we choose to use lightweight description logic to represent the domain
knowledge and study secrecy related reasoning problems. The reason we have chosen lightweight
description logic languages like DL - LiteR, EL and ELH for representing knowledge is that,
on one hand, they have sufficient expressive power for many applications and, on the other
hand, the corresponding reasoning tasks can be done efficiently. There are two more practical
reasons for selecting these languages: (a) reasoning systems are available for these languages.
QuOnto Acciarri et al. (2005) is the standard reasoning system for the language DL-LiteR, and
CEL Mendez and Suntisrivaraporn (2009) is the reasoning system for EL family of languages,
and (b) the popular ontologies like Systemized Nomenclature of Medicine (SNOMED) and
Galen Medical Knowledge Base (GALEN) for medical domain, and the Gene Ontology (GO)
for bioinformatics domain are designed and developed using the DLs EL or its extensions, for
details see Baader et al. (2006). Further, we have considered a language with modal operator
ELH♦ to represent specific domain information. For instance, the statement ‘It is possible
3that Joe is a teacher’ can be modeled as ♦teacher(Joe) in ELH♦ language. ELH♦ is the DL
ELH augmented with the modal operator ♦. The following are some of the reported works in
modalized DLs. Lutz et al. (2001) studied the satisfiability problem in Modalized ALC, and
Tao et al. (2012) studied the query answering problem in Modalized ALC.
1.2 Secrecy-preserving Query Answering Problem
Preserving secrecy in a database setting is a problem of paramount importance and it has
been studied for a long time, see Biskup and Weibert (2008); Biskup et al. (2010); Sicherman
et al. (1983). With the advent of the semantic web and its increasingly pervasive usage, there
is a lot of interest in studying this problem in knowledge base (KB) setting, see Bao et al.
(2007); Grau et al. (2013); Tao et al. (2010, 2014). The concern here is that in view of the
fundamental assumption that KBs possess incomplete knowledge, a situation could arise in
which logical reasoning (used to produce implicit knowledge from the explicit one stored in
the KB) may possibly lead to disclosure of secret information, see Grau et al. (2013). Some
approaches dealing with “information protection” are based on access control mechanisms Bell
and LaPadula (1973), defining appropriate policy languages to represent obligation, provision
and delegation policies Kagal et al. (2003), and based on theory of knowledge (epistemology)
Halpern and O’Neill (2005).
One approach to secrecy in incomplete database was presented in Biskup and Weibert
(2008); Biskup et al. (2010); Biskup and Tadros (2012) in the form of controlled query evaluation
(CQE). The idea behind CQE is that rather than providing strict access control to data, the
CQE approach enforces secrecy by checking (at run time) whether from a truthful answer to
a query a user can deduce secret information. In this case the answer is distorted by either
simply refusing to answer or by outright lying. For a study of confidentiality in a setting that
is an adaptation of CQE framework to ontologies over OWL 2 RL profile of OWL 2, see Grau
et al. (2013).
In response to concerns raised in Weitzner et al. (2008), the authors in Bao et al. (2007); Tao
et al. (2010, 2014), have developed a secrecy framework that attempts to satisfy the following
competing goals: (a) it protects secret information and (b) queries are answered as informatively
4as possible (subject to satisfying property (a)). The notion of an envelope to hide secret
information against logical inference was first defined and used in Tao et al. (2010). In Tao et al.
(2014), the authors introduced a more elaborate conceptual framework for secrecy-preserving
query answering (SPQA) under Open World Assumption (OWA) with multiple querying agents.
This approach is based on OWA and (so far) it has been restricted to instance-checking queries.
Specifically, in Bao et al. (2007); Tao et al. (2010, 2014) the main idea was to utilize the
secret information within the reasoning process, but then answering “Unknown” whenever the
answer is truly unknown or in case the true answer could compromise confidentiality. Further,
in Krishnasamy Sivaprakasam and Slutzki (2016), the authors extended the work of Tao et
al., reported in Tao et al. (2010), to the ELH language and studied secrecy in the context of
assertions as well as general concept inclusions (GCIs).
An approach of SPQA system adapted in this dissertation is explained as follows:
(a) given a KB Σ in the language of our choice, we design a sound and complete tableau algo-
rithm with some suitable restrictions to compute a finite set of assertional consequences
(A∗) or GCI consequences (T ∗) of the KB Σ;
(b) given Σ and a secrecy set S, we compute an envelope E of S by inverting the rules of
tableau algorithm considered in (a), for more details see Tao et al. (2010, 2014). The idea
behind the envelope concept is that no expression in the envelope can be logically deduced
from information outside the envelope. Once such envelopes are computed, the answers to
the queries are censored whenever the queries belong to the envelopes. Since, generally,
an envelope for a given secrecy set is not unique, the developer has some freedom to
output an envelope from the available choices, depending on his/her needs or preferences;
and
(c) given the consequences of Σ (here we consider A∗) and the envelope E for the secrecy set
S, we answer queries without revealing secrets. Usually in SPQA framework queries are
answered by checking their membership in A∗\E. Since, generally, A∗ does not contain all
the statements entailed by Σ, we need to extend the query answering procedure from just
membership checking. Towards that end we have designed recursive algorithms to answer
5more complicated queries. To answer an assertion query q, the algorithm first checks if
q ∈ A∗ \ E in which case the answer is “Yes”; otherwise, the given query is broken into
subqueries based on the constructors, and the algorithm is applied recursively on the
subqueries based on the constructors defined in the language.
In this dissertation, we have studied the SPQA problem for single querying agent in four
different languages. In Chapter 2, we consider the lightweight DL DL-LiteR to study SPQA
problem with secrecy set consisting of both assertional queries and Boolean conjunctive queries
(BCQs). In this case, we assume that TBox T , a finite set of GCIs, is acyclic. Using a
tableau algorithm, we construct A∗, an inferential closure of the given ABox A, a finite set of
assertions, which includes both positive as well as negative assertions. Note that A∗ contains all
the consequences of Σ. We use a notational variant of Kleene 3-valued semantics, which we call
OW-semantics as it fits nicely with OWA. This allows us to answer queries, including Boolean
Conjunctive Queries (BCQs) with “Yes”, “No” or “Unknown”, as opposed to answering just
“Yes” or “No” as in Ontology Based Data Access (OBDA) framework, see Calvanese et al.
(2007), thus improving the informativeness of the query-answering procedure. One of the
main contributions of this work is a study of answering BCQs without compromising secrecy.
Using the idea of secrecy envelopes, we give a precise characterization of when BCQs should
be answered “Yes”, “No” or “Unknown”. We prove the correctness of the secrecy-preserving
query-answering algorithm and briefly discuss its computational complexity.
In Chapter 3, the SPQA problem under OWA for ELH KBs has been presented. In this
work, we allow the querying agents to answer both assertional and GCI queries. We employ
two efficient tableau procedures designed to compute some consequences of ABox (A) and
TBox (T ) denoted by A∗ and T ∗ respectively. A secrecy set of a querying agent is subset S of
A∗ ∪T ∗ which the agent is not allowed to access. Once envelopes are computed, they are used
to efficiently answer assertional and GCI queries without compromising the secret information
in S. Answering GCI queries while preserving secrecy has not been studied in the current
literature. Since we are not computing all the consequences of the KB, answers to the queries
based on just A∗ and T ∗ could be erroneous. To fix this problem, we further augment our
algorithms to make the query answering procedure foolproof. The augmented query answering
6procedures are designed based on the idea of breaking the queries into smaller assertions or
GCIs all the way until the information in the sets A∗ and T ∗ can be used. Further, we prove
that the query answering algorithm is correct and show that it is efficient.
In Chapter 4, we have studied SPQA problem under OWA for ELH♦ KBs. Here ELH♦ is
a description logic ELH augmented with a modal operator ♦. We employ a tableau procedure
designed to compute a rooted labeled tree T which contains information about some assertional
consequences of the given KB. Given a secrecy set S, which is a finite set of assertions, we
compute a function E, called an envelope of S, which assigns a set of assertions to each node
of T. E provides logical protection to the secrecy set S against the reasoning of a querying
agent. Once the tree T and an envelope E are computed, we define the secrecy-preserving tree
TE . Based on the information available in TE , assertional queries with modal operator ♦ can
be answered efficiently while preserving secrecy. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first one studying secrecy-preserving reasoning in description logic augmented with a modal
operator. Since we are not computing all the consequences of the knowledge base, answers to
the queries based on just secrecy-preserving tree TE could be erroneous. To fix this problem,
we further augment our algorithms by providing recursive query decomposition algorithm to
make the query answering procedure foolproof.
7CHAPTER 2. SECRECY-PRESERVING REASONING IN ACYCLIC
DL-LiteR KNOWLEDGE BASES
2.1 Introduction
Recently, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has proposed OWL 2 profiles which
have limited modeling features, but provide substantial improvements in scalability as well as
a significant reduction in the complexity of various reasoning tasks. Based on this proposal,
there has been a lot of work done on developing languages tailored to specific applications, in
particular those that involve massive amount of data, i.e., large ABoxes. In addition, a lot of
work has dealt with answering conjunctive queries over these data sets, see Ortiz and Sˇimkus
(2012). The goal is to provide just enough expressive power to deal with those applications,
while keeping low complexity of reasoning, see Calvanese et al. (2007); Kro¨tzsch (2012). DL−
Lite family is one such family of languages designed with an eye towards precisely these kinds
of applications, see Artale et al. (2009); Calvanese et al. (2007); Ortiz and Sˇimkus (2012).
In this chapter we continue the work begun in Bao et al. (2007); Tao et al. (2010). The
framework introduced in Tao et al. (2014), which we use here as well, was illustrated on very
simple examples: the Propositional Horn Logic and the Description Logic AL. Here we consider
the SPQA problem under OWA for DL-LiteR acyclic KBs. In contrast to previous work, an
important contribution here is that we allow Boolean Conjunctive Assertions/Queries (BCQs)
both in the specification of secrets as well as in the queries. Given a DL-LiteR KB (consisting
of an ABox A and an acyclic TBox T ) and a secrecy set S consisting of both instance-assertions
as well as BCQs, the querying agent is allowed to ask queries of both kinds. Moreover, we allow
the ABox of the KB to contain both positive and negative assertions, see Artale et al. (2009).
By OWA, the answer to a query against a KB can be “Yes”, “No” or “Unknown”. As the first
8step in constructing our SPQA system, we use a tableau algorithm to compute a finite set A∗
which consists of the consequences of the KB (with respect to the TBox), both positive and
negative. To prove the completeness of this algorithm, we use the 3-valued OW-semantics as
introduced in Tao et al. (2014), see also Section 2.2.2. Next, starting from the secrecy set S we
compute a finite set of assertions, viz., the envelope E ⊆ A∗ of the secrecy set S, whose goal
is to provide a “logical shield” against reasoning launched from A∗ \ E (outside the envelope)
and whose aim is to “penetrate” the secrecy set S (i.e., to figure out which assertions are in
S). Computation of the envelope is based on the ideas given in Tao et al. (2010, 2014), viz.,
inversion of the tableau expansion rules used in computing A∗. Moreover, we add two special
expansion rules to deal with BCQs. The details are presented in Section 2.5.
The answer to the instance-checking queries posed to the KB is based on membership of
those queries in the set A∗ \ E. To answer BCQs, we use graph terminology: we express both
the ABox A∗ \E and the BCQ q as node-edge labeled graphs, see also Ortiz and Sˇimkus (2012).
The answer is based on the existence or non-existence of specific mappings between these two
graphs. In more detail, if there is a (labeled) homomorphism from the query graph G[q] (for
q) to the ABox graph G[A∗ \E] (for A∗ \E) then the answer to the query is “Yes”; if there are
no such homomorphisms and there is a ‘non-clashy’ mapping from G[q] to G[A∗ \ E] then the
answer to the query is “Unknown”; otherwise the answer is “No”, see Section 2.6 for details.
Based on the OW-semantics, we are able to provide an exact characterization of all answers.
2.2 Preliminaries - Syntax and semantics of DL-LiteR
2.2.1 Syntax
A vocabulary of DL-LiteR is a triple < NO, NC , NR > of countably infinite, pairwise
disjoint sets. The elements of NO are called objects or individual names, the elements of NC
are called concept names (unary relation symbols) and the elements NR are called role names
(binary relation symbols). The set of basic concepts and the set of basic roles, respectively
denoted by BC and BR, are defined below by the grammar (a) where A ∈ NC , P ∈ NR and P−
stands for the inverse of the role name P . The set of concept expressions and role expressions
9in DL-LiteR, denoted by C and R, is defined by the grammar (b) where B ∈ BC, and R ∈ BR.
(a) B ::= A | ∃R (b) C ::= B | ¬B
R ::= P | P− E ::= R | ¬R
Note that BC ⊆ C, and BR ⊆ R. For C ∈ C and D ∈ BC, we write ¬C to stand for D if
C = ¬D and for ¬D if C = D. Similarly, for E ∈ R and R ∈ BR, ¬E denotes R if E = ¬R
and ¬R if E = R. Assertions in DL-LiteR are expressions of the form C(a) and E(a, b) where
a, b ∈ NO, C ∈ C and E ∈ R; these are called basic assertions if C ∈ BC and E ∈ BR.
There are two types of subsumptions in DL-LiteR,
a) concept subsumptions of the form B v C with B ∈ BC and C ∈ C, and
b) role subsumptions of the form R v E with R ∈ BR and E ∈ R.
Note the asymmetry between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of subsumptions in
DL-LiteR.
2.2.2 Semantics
In this section we reformulate Kleene’s 3-valued logic so as to provide semantics forDL-LiteR
which we feel is particularly well-suited in the context of OWA, see also Tao et al. (2014). It
allows us to give an “epistemic separation” between “known that Yes”, “known that No” and
“Unknown”. We use the idea of weak 3-partition 1, defined as follows. Let X be a non-empty
set, and A1, A2, A3 (possibly empty) subsets of X. The ordered triple (A1, A2, A3) is a weak
3-partition of X if
1. A1 ∪A2 ∪A3 = X and
2. ∀i, j with i 6= j, Ai ∩Aj = ∅.
An OW-interpretation of the language DL-LiteR is a tuple I =
〈
∆, ·I〉 where ∆ is a non-empty
domain and ·I is an interpretation function such that
1It is weak in that we do not require that the sets Ai are non-empty.
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• ∀a ∈ NO, aI ∈ ∆,
• ∀A ∈ NC , AI = (AIN , AIU , AIY ) is a weak 3-partition of ∆, and
• ∀P ∈ NR, P I = (P IN , P IU , P IY ) is a weak 3-partition of ∆×∆.
We extend the interpretation function ·I inductively to all concept and role expressions as
follows. Let C ∈ BC, P ∈ NR, R ∈ BR and suppose that CI = (CIN , CIU , CIY ), P I =
(P IN , P
I
U , P
I
Y ) and R
I = (RIN , R
I
U , R
I
Y ). Then,
• (¬C)I = (CIY , CIU , CIN ) and (¬R)I = (RIY , P IU , RIN ),
• (P−)I = ((P−)IN , (P−)IU , (P−)IY ), where (P−)IX = {(a, b)| (b, a) ∈ P IX}, X ∈ {N,U, Y },
• (∃R)I = ((∃R)IN , (∃R)IU , (∃R)IY ), where (∃R)IY = {a| ∃b ∈ ∆[(a, b) ∈ RIY ]}, (∃R)IN =
{a| ∀b ∈ ∆[(a, b) ∈ RIN ]} and (∃R)IU = ∆ \ ((∃R)IY ∪ (∃R)IN ).
Remark 1: The subscripts “N ”, “U ” and “Y ” stand for “No”, “Unknown” and “Yes”,
which represent the possible dispositions of a domain element with respect to a given OW-
interpretation of a concept. Similarly, for roles. In addition, all the weak 3-partitions in
this chapter are ordered: First the N -component, second the U -component and third the
Y -component.
Let I = 〈∆, ·I〉 be an OW-interpretation, B ∈ BC, C ∈ C, R ∈ BR, E ∈ R and a, b ∈ NO.
We say that
• I satisfies C(a), notation I |= C(a), if aI ∈ CIY ;
• I satisfies E(a, b), notation I |= E(a, b), if (aI , bI) ∈ EIY ;
• I satisfies B v C, notation I |= B v C, if BIY ⊆ CIY and CIN ⊆ BIN , and
• I satisfies R v E, notation I |= R v E, if RIY ⊆ EIY and EIN ⊆ RIN .
DL-LiteR KB is a pair Σ = 〈A, T 〉, where A, called the ABox 2, is a finite, non-empty set of
assertions of the form A(a), ¬A(a), P (a, b) and ¬P (a, b) with A ∈ NC , P ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO,
2Note that we do not allow assertions of the form ∃R(a) in the ABox A
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and T is a finite set of concept and role subsumptions, called TBox. An OW-interpretation
I = 〈∆, ·I〉 is an OW-model of Σ, notation I |= Σ, if for all α ∈ A ∪ T , I |= α. Let α be
an assertion or a concept/role subsumption. We say that Σ entails α, notation Σ |= α, if all
OW-models of Σ satisfy α.
Remark 2: OW-interpretations have many applications in Computer Science, see Avron
(1991); Fitting (1985). There are several reasons why OW-interpretations are of particular
interest in our work.
• OW-interpretations naturally reflect the Open World Assumption (OWA) which applies
to most KB applications. Thus, one way think of an OW-interpretation is as an agent
of sorts, who, when presented with a particular scenario, may not possess complete in-
formation regarding the various memberships of domain elements in the interpretation of
some concepts and roles.
• Since the classical (the usual 2-valued) interpretations are special kind of OW-interpretations,
no generality is lost. Actually, some flexibility is gained in that OW-interpretations can, if
needed, interpret some concepts (or roles) classically while others using the OW-approach.
• Another, more technical, reason is the following. As part of the completeness proof,
we need to show that Σ |= ¬A(a) implies ¬A(a) ∈ A∗ where A∗ is a completed ABox
(i.e., no assertion expansion rules are applicable). This can be easily shown using OW-
interpretations, see Section 2.2.2. This result is very important because completeness
proof plays a central role in proving the correctness of the query answering procedure.
However, since generally, classical interpretations satisfy (¬A)I ≡ ∆\AI 6= {aI | ¬A(a) ∈
A∗}, the above implication does hot hold.
2.3 Computation of A∗
In this section, we will use a tableau-style procedure to construct a set of consequences of
the given KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉, denoted by A∗. Since our main interest in this chapter is studying
secrecy-preserving query answering, we shall henceforth assume that all TBoxes are acyclic
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which will guarantee that A∗ is finite. Finding the set of all assertions entailed by an EL+ KB
with acyclic TBox has been considered by Mei et al., see Mei et al. (2009).
Given Σ = 〈A, T 〉, before we start computing A∗, first we arrange the individual names
occurring in Σ, assertions in A and subsumptions in T in lexicographic order. Also, we program
the algorithm which computes A∗ in a way that selects these individual names, assertions and
subsumptions in lexicographic order. This ordering will enable us to get a unique A∗, see
Calvanese et al. (2007). The computation of A∗ proceeds in several stages. In the first stage,
A∗ is initialized as A and expanded by exhaustively applying expansion rules listed in Figure
2.1. The resulting ABox is denoted by A∗1. The sets of all the individual names appearing in
A and A∗1 are denoted by OΣ and O∗, respectively. O∗ is initialized as OΣ and expanded with
applications of the vN∃- and v∃∃-rules. An individual a is said to be fresh if a ∈ O∗ \ OΣ . It
is important to note that all the fresh individuals are added in the first stage (Figure 2.1) and
no new individuals are added in the following stages. This can be easily seen by inspecting
the rules in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. The rules are designed based on subsumptions present in
the TBox T . To name the rules in Figure 2.1, we adopt the following conventions. The first
subscript of v represents the type of the symbol on the left hand side of the subsumption, and
the second represents the type of the symbol on the right hand side. For example, the vN∃ -
rule has a concept name on the left hand side of the subsumption and existential restriction on
the right hand side.
In order to write the rules more succinctly, we define two functions inv (standing for inverse)
and neg (standing for negation) as follows:
• for P ∈ NR, inv(R,a,b) =

P (a, b) if R = P,
P (b, a) if R = P−
• for R ∈ BR, neg(E,a,b) =

inv(R, a, b) if E = R,
¬inv(R, a, b) if E = ¬R
For instance, neg(¬P−, a, b) = ¬inv(P−, a, b) = ¬P (b, a). In addition, we use L to denote
either a concept name or a negation of concept name. We write ¬L with the intended meaning
that ¬L = ¬A if L = A, and ¬L = A if L = ¬A.
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vNL − rule : if A(a) ∈ A∗, A v L ∈ T and L(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {L(a)};
vN∃ − rule : if A(a) ∈ A∗, A v ∃R ∈ T , and ∀d ∈ O∗, inv(R, a, d) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {inv(R, a, b)} where b is fresh, and O∗ := O∗ ∪ {b};
v∃L − rule : if inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗, ∃R v L ∈ T , and L(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {L(a)};
v∃∃ − rule : if inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗, ∃R v ∃S ∈ T , and ∀d ∈ O∗, inv(S, a, d) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {inv(S, a, c)} where c is fresh, and O∗ := O∗ ∪ {c};
vRE − rule : if inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗, R v E ∈ T and neg(E, a, b) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {neg(E, a, b)}.
We use the following conventions not stated explicitly within the individual rules:
A ∈ NC , L ∈ {A,¬A | A ∈ NC}, R, S ∈ BR and E ∈ R.
Figure 2.1 Expansion rules for computing A∗1
vN@ − rule : Let A(a) ∈ A∗ and A v ¬∃R ∈ T .
∀c ∈ O∗ : if ¬inv(R, a, c) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬inv(R, a, c)};
v∃@ − rule : Let inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗ and ∃R v ¬∃S ∈ T .
∀c ∈ O∗ : if ¬inv(S, a, c) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬inv(S, a, c)}.
Computing A∗12: An application of each rule adds negation of role assertions for all c ∈ O∗
Figure 2.2 Expansion rules for computing A∗12
In the second stage, A∗1 is expanded by applying expansion rules listed in Figure 2.2. The
resulting ABox is denoted as A∗12. Observe that every application of a rule in Figure 2.2
adds at most |O∗| new assertions to A∗1. To name the rules in Figure 2.2, we adopt the same
naming conventions as for the rules in Figure 2.1 except that the second symbol in the subscript
represents the right hand side of v: @ stands for a negated unqualified existential restriction.
In the third stage, A∗12 is expanded by applying rules listed in Figure 2.3. The resulting
final ABox is denoted as A∗. To name the rules in Figure 2.3, we follow the previously adopted
conventions. Additionally, negation in the subscript (see Figure 2.3) should be thought of as
follows: For each rule in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, e.g. vNL-rule with A v L, we have a corresponding
vNL¬-rule, which captures the effect of the subsumption ¬L v ¬A (which is not allowed in
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vNL¬ − rule : if ¬L(a) ∈ A∗, A v L ∈ T and ¬A(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬A(a)};
vN∃¬ − rule : if ∀b ∈ O∗, ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗, A v ∃R ∈ T , and ¬A(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬A(a)};
v∃L¬ − rule : Let ¬L(a) ∈ A∗ and ∃R v L ∈ T .
∀c ∈ O∗ : if ¬inv(R, a, c) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬inv(R, a, c)};
v∃∃¬ − rule : Let ∀b ∈ O∗, ¬inv(S, a, b) ∈ A∗ and ∃R v ∃S ∈ T .
∀c ∈ O∗ : if ¬inv(R, a, c) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬inv(R, a, c)};
vRE¬ − rule : if ¬neg(E, a, b) ∈ A∗, R v E ∈ T and ¬inv(R, a, b) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬inv(R, a, b)};
vN@¬ − rule : if inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗, A v ¬∃R ∈ T and ¬A(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬A(a)}.
v∃@¬ − rule : Let inv(S, a, b) ∈ A∗ and ∃R v ¬∃S ∈ T .
∀c ∈ O∗ : if ¬inv(R, a, c) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {¬inv(R, a, c)}.
We use the same conventions as in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.3 Expansion rules for computing A∗
our syntax). It is easy to see that during the execution of rules in Figure 2.3 none of the rules
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 becomes applicable.
We say that A∗ is completed or that it is an assertional closure of Σ = 〈A, T 〉 if no assertion
expansion rule is applicable. We denote by Λ the tableau algorithm which (lexicographically)
applies assertion expansion rules, first those in Figure 2.1 then those in Figure 2.2 and finally
those in Figure 2.3, until no further applications are possible. Since, as explained previously,
Λ works in a lexicographic fashion, for a given KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉, it outputs a unique A∗.
Since some of the expansion rules can in some cases be applied exponentially many times
in the size of the KB, the size of A∗ can be exponential in the size of the KB. As an example
consider a DL−LiteR KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉, whereA = {A(a)} and T = {A v ∃P1, A v ∃Q1,∃P−i v
∃Pi+1, ∃P−i v ∃Qi+1, Qi v Pi+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Clearly, TBox T is acyclic and the size of the KB
is linear in n. To compute A∗ for this KB, the v∃∃-rule has to be applied exponentially many
times. It follows that A∗ is exponential in the size of the Σ, implying that the computation of
A∗ could require exponential time as well.
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Example 2.3.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a DL-LiteR KB, where A is defined by 1 and 2, and T is
defined by 3, 4, 5 and 6,
1 A(a) 3 A v B 5 ∃P− v ¬∃R
2 D(b) 4 A v ∃P 6 C v ¬D
Applying the assertion expansion rules in Figure 2.1, we can derive the following conclu-
sions.
7 B(a) vNL on 1,3
8 P (a, c), c is fresh vN∃ on 1,4
Therefore A∗1 = A ∪ {B(a), P (a, c)}. Now applying the assertion expansion rules in Figure
2.2 on A∗1, we calculate A∗12.
9 ¬R(c, a),¬R(c, b),¬R(c, c) v∃@ on 8,5
Thus A∗12 = A∗1∪{¬R(c, a),¬R(c, b),¬R(c, c)}. Finally, using the assertion expansion rules
in Figure 2.3 on A∗12, we get A∗.
10 ¬C(b) vNL¬ on 2,6
Hence, A∗ = A∗12 ∪ {¬C(b)}.
Observe that if we restrict the application of expansions rules in Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3
to those ABox assertions involving only non-fresh individual names then we get {A(a), B(a),
D(b),¬C(b)}. 
In general, if the computation is restricted to ABox assertions involving non-fresh individual
names, then it is easy to see that the size of A∗ is polynomial in the size of Σ and that it can
be computed in polynomial time.
Soundness: The proof of the soundness of the tableau procedure Λ is split into two parts,
dealing separately with rules in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and Figure 2.3. The proof of Lemma 2.3.1
is standard and given in Appendix A.1.1.
Lemma 2.3.1 (Soundness of Λ, Part A). Let A∗12 be a completed ABox obtained from Σ
by first applying the rules listed in Figure 2.1 and then the rules of Figure 2.2. Then for every
OW-model I of Σ, there is a OW-model I∗12 of Σ such that I∗12 |= A∗12, where the domain of
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I∗12 is same as the domain of I and I∗12 remains same as I except for the interpretation of fresh
individuals.
Let O∗ be the set of individual names that occur in the completed ABox A∗12. We define
a new OW-interpretation I∗ = 〈∆∗, ·I∗〉, where ∆∗ = I∗12(O∗), i.e., ∆∗ is precisely the set of
those elements of ∆ that are interpretations of individuals in O∗. The interpretation function
·I∗ is defined as a restriction of I∗12 to ∆∗:
(i) ∀a ∈ O∗[aI∗ = aI∗12 ];
(ii) ∀A ∈ NC [(AI∗N = A
I∗12
N ∩∆∗, AI
∗
U = A
I∗12
U ∩∆∗, AI
∗
Y = A
I∗12
Y ∩∆∗)];
(iii) ∀P ∈ NR[P I∗N = P
I∗12
N ∩ (∆∗×∆∗), P I
∗
U = P
I∗12
U ∩ (∆∗×∆∗), P I
∗
Y = P
I∗12
Y ∩ (∆∗×∆∗)] and
(iv) I∗ is extended to compound concepts and roles as in Section 2.2.2.
Since every weak 3-partition of ∆ induces a weak 3-partition of ∆∗, we have the following
consequence of Lemma 2.3.1,
Corollary 2.3.1. I∗ is an OW-model of 〈A∗12, T 〉.
The proof of the next lemma is standard and given in Appendix A.1.2.
Lemma 2.3.2 (Soundness of Λ, Part B). Let A∗ be the completed ABox obtained from A∗12
by applying the rules listed in Figure 2.3. For any OW-model I of Σ, let I∗ = 〈∆∗, ·I∗〉 be an
OW-interpretation as defined above. Then, I∗ is an OW-model of Σ and I∗ |= A∗.
In summary, given an OW-model I of Σ, using the proof of Lemma 2.3.1, we transform
I to another OW-model I∗12 of Σ such that I∗12 |= A∗12, where the domain of I∗12 is same as
the domain of I. In fact, I∗12 remains the same as I except for the interpretation of fresh
individuals. Moreover, I∗12 is constructed in a canonical fashion, i.e., it is uniquely determined
from I. Having obtained I∗12, using Lemma 2.3.2, we modify I∗12 to obtain yet another OW-
model I∗ of Σ such that I∗ |= A∗, where the domain of I∗ was defined to be I∗12(O∗).
We use the notation Σ |=∗ α, where α is a concept (or role) name assertion or negation of
a concept (or role) name assertion, to represent the following statement: For every OW-model
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I of Σ, I∗ is an OW-model of Σ and I∗ |= α. We can combine Lemma 2.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.2
into a single theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1. (Soundness of Λ): Let A∗ be a completed ABox obtained from Σ by first
applying the rules listed in Figure 2.1, then rules listed in Figure 2.2, and finally the rules listed
in Figure 2.3. Then Σ |=∗ A∗, i.e., for every α ∈ A∗, Σ |=∗ α.
Completeness: To prove the completeness of Λ, we first define a canonical OW-interpretation
J = 〈∆, ·J 〉 for a completed ABox A∗ as follows:
- ∆ = O∗ = {a ∈ NO| a occurs in A∗};
- aJ = a, for each individual name a ∈ O∗;
- for A ∈ NC , AJ = (AJN , AJU , AJY ), where
AJY = {a| A(a) ∈ A∗},
AJN = {a| ¬A(a) ∈ A∗} and
AJU = (∆ \AJY ) \AJN ;
- for P ∈ NR, PJ = (PJN , PJU , PJY ), where
PJY = {(a, b)| P (a, b) ∈ A∗},
PJN = {(a, b)| ¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗} and
PJU = ((∆×∆) \ PJY ) \ PJN ;
- J is extended to compound concepts and roles as in Section 2.2.2
The proof that J is a OW-model of Σ is standard and given in the Appendix A.1.3.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a DL-LiteR KB. Then ∀α ∈ A ∪ T , J |= α.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Completeness of Λ). Let A∗ be a completed ABox obtained from Σ by
applying Λ. Let α be a concept (or role) name assertion or negation of a concept (or role)
name assertion 3. Then Σ |=∗ α ⇒ α ∈ A∗.
3Recall that assertions of the form ∃R(a) do not belong to A∗
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Proof. Let J be the canonical model of Σ as defined above, and let α be an assertion as in
the statement of the theorem. Suppose Σ |=∗ α. By Lemma 2.3.3, J |= Σ and hence J ∗ |= α.
Since A∗ is completed, J ∗ = J , and so J |= α. In the following, we argue by cases for different
α.
- α = A(a), A ∈ NC . Then, J |= A(a)⇒ a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗.
- α = ¬A(a), A ∈ NC . Then, J |= ¬A(a)⇒ a ∈ AJN ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗.
- α = P (a, b), P ∈ NR. Then, J |= P (a, b)⇒ (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (a, b) ∈ A∗.
- α = ¬P (a, b), P ∈ NR. Then, J |= ¬P (a, b)⇒ (a, b) ∈ PJN ⇒ ¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗. 
2.4 Graph representation of ABoxes and BCQs over DL-LiteR KBs
In this section, we will use node-edge labeled directed graph to represent the completed
ABox A∗ as well as Boolean conjunctive queries (BCQs), see Ortiz and Sˇimkus (2012) for
similar representations. This helps “visualize” reasoning about such queries as well as being
useful in formulating precise conditions for answering BCQs with ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Unknown’.
The ABox graph for A∗ is node-edge labeled digraph G[A∗] = (V [A∗], E[A∗], L[A∗]) with
nodes V [A∗] = O∗ and edges E[A∗] = {(a, b) | R(a, b) ∈ A∗, for some R ∈ R}, where each
node a ∈ V [A∗] is labeled with the set of literals L[A∗](a) = { L | L(a) ∈ A∗} and each directed
edge (a, b) ∈ E[A∗] is labeled with a set of roles L[A∗](a, b) = { R | R(a, b) ∈ A∗}.
Example 2.4.1. Let A∗ = {A(a),¬D(a), B(b), F (b), H(d), P (a, b), Q(a, b), P (b, c), Q(b, c), R(a, d),
¬S(a, d),¬Q(c, c)}. Then ABox graph G[A∗] for A∗ is given in Figure 2.4.
We next define the syntax and semantics of Boolean conjunctive queries. Let NV denote a
countably infinite set of variables.
Definition 2.4.1. A Boolean conjunctive query over DL-LiteR is a finite expression of the
form ∃y1, y2, ..., yn[
∧k
i=1Ai(ζi) ∧
∧m
j=1 Pj(ηj , µj)], where
- Ai ∈ NC for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Pj ∈ NR for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and yl ∈ NV , 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
- ζi, ηj , µj ∈ {y1, y2, ..., yn} ∪NO for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ m .
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Figure 2.4 The ABox and query graphs
Query atoms of a BCQ q are of two sorts: concept atoms A(v), and role atoms P (u, v),
where u, v ∈ NV ∪NO, A ∈ NC and P ∈ NR. By Atoms(q) we denote the set of concept and
role atoms occurring in q. For instance the concept atoms in the BCQ q = ∃y, z[A(b)∧B(y)∧
B(z) ∧ P (b, y) ∧ Q(b, z) ∧ P (z, y)] are: A(b), B(y) and B(z) and the role atoms are: P (b, y),
Q(b, z) and P (z, y).
As was the case with the ABox, we can represent the BCQ as a node-edge labeled directed
graph capturing the syntactic structure of the query. The query graph of a BCQ q is the
node-edge labeled directed graph G[q] = (V [q], E[q], L[q]) with nodes V [q] = {v ∈ NV ∪
NO | v occurs in q} and edges E[q] = {(u, v) | for some role name P, P (u, v) ∈ Atoms(q)};
each node v ∈ V [q] is labeled with the set of concept names L[q](v) = {A| A(v) ∈ Atoms(q)}
and each edge (u, v) ∈ E[q] is labeled with the set of role names L[q](u, v) = {P | P (u, v) ∈
Atoms(q)}.
Example 2.4.2. The query graph G[q] of the BCQ q = ∃y, z[A(b) ∧ B(y) ∧ B(z) ∧ P (b, y) ∧
Q(b, z) ∧ P (z, y)] mentioned above is given in Figure 2.4.
An interpretation of a BCQ q is provided by an OW-interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉 together
with a valuation which is a function pi : V [q] → ∆ such that pi(a) = aI for each individual
a ∈ V [q] ∩ NO. We say that (I, pi) satisfies A(v), notation (I, pi) |= A(v), if pi(v) ∈ AIY .
(I, pi) falsifies A(v), notation (I, pi) |= ¬A(v), if pi(v) ∈ AIN . Similarly, (I, pi) satisfies P (u, v),
notation (I, pi) |= P (u, v), if (pi(u), pi(v)) ∈ P IY and (I, pi) falsifies P (u, v), notation (I, pi) |=
¬P (u, v), if (pi(u), pi(v)) ∈ P IN . We say that (I, pi) satisfies q, notation (I, pi) |= q, if (I, pi) |= α
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for every α ∈ Atoms(q). (I, pi) falsifies q, notation (I, pi) ||= q, if (I, pi) falsifies some atom
α ∈ Atoms(q). I satisfies q, notation I |= q, if there exists a valuation pi : V [q]→ ∆ such that
(I, pi) |= q. In this case, we say that I is an OW-model of q. I falsifies q, notation I ||= q, if
for all valuations pi : V [q]→ ∆, (I, pi) ||= q.
Recall that given any OW-model I of Σ we have defined (a uniquely determined) OW-
model I∗ and we introduced the notation Σ |=∗ α to mean that for any OW-model I of Σ, I∗
is an OW-model of Σ and I∗ |= α. Finally, a BCQ q is entailed from Σ, notation Σ |=∗ q, if
for every OW-model I of Σ, I∗ |= q. A BCQ q is disentailed from Σ, notation Σ ||=∗ q, if for
every OW-model I of Σ, I∗ ||= q.
Notation: We write h : V [q] −→c V [A∗] to denote the fact that h is a mapping h : V [q] →
V [A∗] which “respects constants”, i.e. h(a) = a, for every individual a ∈ V [q] ∩NO.
Definition 2.4.2. Mapping h : V [q] −→c V [A∗] is a labeled graph homomorphism, if
- for every node v in V [q], L[q](v) ⊆ L[A∗](h(v)), and
- for every edge (u, v) in E[q], L[q](u, v) ⊆ L[A∗](h(u), h(v)).
In the next two theorems we provide a complete characterization of entailment and disen-
tailment of BCQs in terms of properties of mappings h : V [q] −→c V [A∗].
Theorem 2.4.1. Let q be a BCQ and Σ a DL-LiteR KB. Then, Σ |=∗ q iff there exists a
labeled graph homomorphism h : V [q] −→c V [A∗].
Proof. (⇒) Suppose Σ |=∗ q and let J = 〈∆, ·J 〉 be the canonical OW-model of Σ. Then,
J ∗ = J , and by hypothesis, J |= q. Hence, for some valuation pi : V [q] → O∗ = V [A∗],
(J , pi) |= α, for every α ∈ Atoms(q). Note that pi : V [q] −→c V [A∗]. Now, let v ∈ V [q] and
A(v) ∈ Atoms(q). Then, (J , pi) |= A(v) ⇒ pi(v) ∈ AJY ⇒ A(pi(v)) ∈ A∗ ⇒ A ∈ L[A∗](pi(v)).
Similarly, for u, v ∈ V [q] with P (u, v) ∈ Atoms(q): (J , pi) |= P (u, v) ⇒ (pi(u), pi(v)) ∈ PJY ⇒
P (pi(u), pi(v)) ∈ A∗ ⇒ P ∈ L[A∗](pi(u), pi(v)). It follows that pi is a labeled graph homomor-
phism.
(⇐) Assume that h : V [q] −→c V [A∗] is a labeled graph homomorphism and let I =
〈
∆, ·I〉 be
an arbitrary OW-model of Σ. By Lemma 2.3.2, I∗ = 〈∆∗, ·I∗〉, with ∆∗ = I∗(O∗), is an OW-
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model of Σ and I∗ |= A∗. Since (I∗ ◦ h) : V [q] → ∆∗, we have (I∗ ◦ h)(a) = I∗(h(a)) = aI∗
for all a ∈ V [q] ∩ NO. I.e. I∗ ◦ h is a valuation. It remains to show that I∗ is an OW-
model of q. Let v ∈ V [q] and A ∈ L[q](v). Then, by the definition of labeled homomorphism,
A ∈ L[A∗](h(v))⇒ A(h(v)) ∈ A∗ ⇒ h(v)I∗ ∈ AI∗Y ⇒ (I∗◦h)(v) ∈ AI
∗
Y ⇒ (I∗, (I∗◦h)) |= A(v).
Similarly, for u, v ∈ V [q] with P ∈ L[q](u, v): P ∈ L[A∗](h(u), h(v)) ⇒ P (h(u), h(v)) ∈ A∗ ⇒
(h(u)I∗ , h(v)I∗) ∈ P I∗Y ⇒ ((I∗ ◦ h)(u), (I∗ ◦ h)(v)) ∈ P I
∗
Y ⇒ (I∗, (I∗ ◦ h)) |= P (u, v). Thus,
Σ |=∗ q. 
Next we define mappings that cannot be extended to labeled homomorphisms and prove a
tight connection between such mappings and disentailment.
Definition 2.4.3. A mapping f : V [q] −→c V [A∗] is said to be clashy, if
- there exist v ∈ V [q] and A ∈ L[q](v) such that ¬A ∈ L[A∗](f(v)), or
- there exist u, v ∈ V [q] and P ∈ L[q]((u, v)) such that ¬P ∈ L[A∗]((f(u), f(v))).
Theorem 2.4.2. Let q be a BCQ and Σ a DL-LiteR KB. Then, Σ ||=∗ q iff every mapping
f : V [q] −→c V [A∗] is clashy.
Proof. (⇒) Assume Σ ||=∗ q and let J = 〈∆, ·J 〉 be the canonical OW-model of Σ. Then,
J ∗ = J and so for every valuation τ : V [q] → ∆∗, there is an α ∈ Atoms(q) such that
(J , τ) |= ¬α. Since ∆∗ = J (O∗) = O∗ = V (A∗) and τ(a) = aJ = a for all a ∈ V [q] ∩ NO,
τ : V [q] −→c V [A∗] and it follows that τ is clashy. Moreover, since τ is arbitary the conclusion
follows.
(⇐) Suppose now that every mapping f : V [q] −→c V [A∗] is clashy. Let I =
〈
∆, ·I〉 be an
arbitrary OW-model of Σ. By Lemma 2.3.2, I∗ = 〈∆∗, ·I∗〉 with ∆∗ = I∗(O∗) is an OW-model
of Σ such that I∗ |= A∗. Let pi : V [q] → ∆∗ be an arbitrary valuation and define the mapping
gpi : V [q]→ V [A∗] by
gpi(v)=

a if v = a ∈ NO ∩ V [q]
c if v ∈ NV ∩ V [q],
where pi(v) = cI∗ and c be the first constant that satisfies in some arbitrary (but fixed) total or-
dering of O∗. It is easy to check that pi = I∗◦gpi (in other words, pi factors via V [A∗]). Since, by
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assumption, gpi is clashy, for some A(v) ∈ Atoms(q), ¬A ∈ L[A∗](gpi(v)) or for some P (u, v) ∈
Atoms(q), ¬P ∈ L[A∗]((gpi(u), gpi(v))). In the first case, ¬A(gpi(v)) ∈ A∗ ⇒ gpi(v)I∗ ∈ AI∗N ⇒
pi(v) ∈ AI∗N implying, (I∗, pi) |= ¬A(v). In the second case, ¬P ((gpi(u), gpi(v))) ∈ A∗ ⇒
(gpi(u)
I∗ , gpi(v)I
∗
) ∈ P I∗N ⇒ (pi(u), pi(v)) ∈ P I
∗
N implying, (I∗, pi) |= ¬P (u, v). It follows that,
Σ ||=∗ q. 
2.5 Secrecy-Preserving Reasoning in DL-LiteR KBs
Given a knowledge base Σ and a finite secrecy set S consisting of assertions in A∗ and
BCQs, the goal is to answer queries while preserving secrecy. Here we assume that A∗ has been
computed previously. Our approach is to compute a subset E ⊆ A∗, called the secrecy envelope
for S, so that by protecting E, the querying agent cannot logically infer any assertions in S,
see Tao et al. (2010, 2014). It is interesting to note that, though the BCQs in S are not in E,
we can store the information pertinent to answering BCQs in E. The OWA plays a vital role
in protecting secret information when query answering is the main objective. When answering
a query with “Unknown”, the querying agent cannot differentiate between the following cases:
(1) the case that the answer to the query is actually unknown to the KB reasoner and (2) the
case that the answer is being protected in order to maintain secrecy.
Formally, the secrecy set is made of two parts, S = SΣ ∪ SCQ, where SΣ ⊆ A∗0 ⊆ A∗ with
A∗0 the subset of assertions which do not involve fresh individuals, and SCQ is a finite set of
BCQs. Clearly, the size of A∗0 is polynomial to the size of the input KB.
Definition 2.5.1. Given a knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S = SΣ ∪ SCQ,
where SΣ ⊆ A∗ and SCQ is a finite set of BCQs, a secrecy envelope for S, denoted by E, is a
set of assertions having the following properties:
1 SΣ ⊆ E ⊆ A∗,
2 for every α ∈ E, A∗ \ E 6|=∗ α, and
3 for every q ∈ SCQ, A∗ \ E 6|=∗ q and A∗ \ E |6|=∗ q.
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v←NL − rule : if L(a) ∈ E, A v L ∈ T and A(a) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then E := E ∪ {A(a)};
v←∃L − rule : if L(a) ∈ E, ∃R v L ∈ T and inv(R, a, c) ∈ A∗ \ E, for some c ∈ O∗
then E := E ∪ {inv(R, a, c)};
v←RE − rule : if neg(E, a, b) ∈ E, R v E ∈ T and inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then E := E ∪ {inv(R, a, b)};
v←N@ − rule : if ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ E, A v ¬∃R ∈ T and A(a) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then E := E ∪ {A(a)};
v←∃@ − rule : if ¬inv(S, a, b) ∈ E, ∃R v ¬∃S ∈ T and inv(R, a, c) ∈ A∗ \ E,
for some c ∈ O∗, then E := E ∪ {inv(R, a, c)}.
Figure 2.5 Secrecy closure rules obtained by inverting rules in Figures 2.1 and 2.2
.
Property 2 says that no information in E can be entailed from A∗ \ E. Property 3 makes
sure that BCQs in SCQ can neither be entailed nor disentailed from A∗ \ E. To compute an
envelope, we use the idea of inverting assertion expansion rules (see Tao et al. (2010), where
this approach was first utilized). Induced by the tableau expansion rules in Figure 2.1 (except
for the rules vN∃ and v∃∃) and in Figure 2.2, we have the corresponding “inverted” secrecy
closure rules in Figure 2.5. The reason for the omission of secrecy closure rules corresponding
to the rules vN∃ and v∃∃ is that an application of these rules results in adding assertions with
fresh individual names. By the hidden name assumptions (HNA), the querying agent is barred
from asking any queries that involve fresh individual names, see also Tao et al. (2010).
As an illustration of a secrecy closure rules in Figure 2.5, consider the v←N@-rule. Let
¬P (a, b) ∈ E, A v ¬∃P ∈ T and A(a) ∈ A∗ \ E. If the querying agent asks the query
q = ¬P (a, b), then the reasoner R could answer “Yes”. This is because of the vN@-rule and the
fact that A(a) /∈ E. So, to protect ¬P (a, b), we have to put A(a) in E. Similarly, in Figure 2.6
the secrecy closure rules are given corresponding to the rules in Figure 2.3. For instance, we
consider the v←∃L¬-rule. Let ¬P (a, b) ∈ E, ∃P v B ∈ T and ¬B(a) ∈ A∗ \ E. If the querying
agent asks the query q = ¬P (a, b), then the reasoner R could answer “Yes”. This is because
of the v∃L¬-rule and the fact that ¬B(a) /∈ E. So, to protect ¬P (a, b), we have to put ¬B(a)
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v←NL¬ − rule : if ¬A(a) ∈ E, A v L ∈ T and ¬L(a) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then E := E ∪ {¬L(a)};
v←N∃¬ − rule : if ¬A(a) ∈ E, A v ∃R ∈ T and ∀b ∈ O∗, ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then pick a c ∈ O∗ such that E := E ∪ {¬inv(R, a, c)};
v←∃L¬ − rule : if ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ E, ∃R v L ∈ T and ¬L(a) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then E := E ∪ {¬L(a)};
v←∃∃¬ − rule : if ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ E, ∃R v ∃S ∈ T and ∀c ∈ O∗,¬inv(S, a, c)
∈ A∗ \ E, then pick a d ∈ O∗ such that E := E ∪ {¬inv(S, a, d)};
v←RE¬ − rule : if ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ E, R v E ∈ T and ¬neg(E, a, b) ∈ A∗ \ E,
then E := E ∪ {¬neg(E, a, b)};
v←N@¬ − rule : if ¬A(a) ∈ E, A v ¬∃R ∈ T and inv(R, a, c) ∈ A∗ \ E,
for some c ∈ O∗, then E := E ∪ {inv(R, a, b)};
v←∃@¬ − rule : if ¬inv(R, a, b) ∈ E, ∃R v ¬∃S ∈ T and inv(S, a, c) ∈ A∗ \ E,
for some c ∈ O∗, then E := E ∪ {inv(S, a, c)}
Figure 2.6 Secrecy closure rules obtained by inverting rules in Figure 2.3
in E. In both cases, these secrecy closure rules are named by adding the superscript ← in the
name of the corresponding assertion expansion rules.
Rules that specifically deal with BCQs are given in Figure 2.7. Few words of explanation
may be helpful in understanding BCQ-rules. These rules have been designed to protect BCQ’s
in SCQ. Let q ∈ SCQ be a BCQ. To protect q, we use BCQh-rule which “disrupts” each
homomorphism h : G[q] → G[A∗ \ E] and adds to E one of the atoms of q (whose variables
are evaluated under h). Similarly, in the BCQc-rule, we pick an arbitrary clashy mapping
g : G[q]→ G[A∗ \ E] and make it into a non-clashy mapping: This can be done by considering
all the clashy atoms of q under g (A ∈ L[q](v) and ¬A ∈ L[A∗ \ E](g(v)), or P ∈ L[q]((u, v))
and ¬P ∈ L[A∗ \ E](g(u), g(v))) and adding them to E.
The computation of E proceeds in two stages. In the first step, E is initialized as SΣ and
expanded by using secrecy closure rules listed in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. In the second stage, E
is expanded by using BCQh and BCQc-rules. We denote by ΛS the tableau algorithm which
computes the envelope E by using secrecy closure rules listed in Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 until
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BCQh − rule : if q ∈ SCQ, and there is a labeled homomorphism
h : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] such that
{A1(h(ζ1)), .., Ak(h(ζk)), P1(h(η1), h(µ1)), ..,
Pm(h(ηm), h(µm))} ∩ E = ∅
then E := E ∪ {Ap(h(ζp))} for some 1 ≤ p ≤ k or
E := E ∪ {Pr(h(ηr), h(µr))} for some 1 ≤ r ≤ m;
BCQc − rule : if q ∈ SCQ, and every f : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] is clashy, then
pick one such clashy mapping g. Then,
• ∀p, 1 ≤ p ≤ k, if ¬Ap(g(ζp)) ∈ A∗ \ E then
E := E ∪ {¬Ap(g(ζp))}, and
• ∀r, 1 ≤ r ≤ m, if ¬Pr(g(ηr), g(µr)) ∈ A∗ \ E then
E := E ∪ {¬Pr(g(ηr), g(µr))}.
q = ∃y1, ., yn[A1(ζ1) ∧ ... ∧Ak(ζk) ∧ P1(η1, µ1) ∧ .... ∧ Pm(ηm, µm)]
Figure 2.7 Secrecy closure rules for q ∈ SCQ
no more rules are applicable. Due to non-determinism in applying the BCQ-rules, different
executions of ΛS may result different envelopes. Since A∗ is finite, the computation of ΛS
terminates. Let E be the output of ΛS . By the assumption that SΣ ⊆ A∗, and by the BCQh-
and BCQc-rules, it is easy to see that E ⊆ A∗.
Example 2.5.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a DL-LiteR KB, where A = {A(a), B(a), E(a),¬F (a)}
and T = {A v D, A v ¬C, A v ∃P, B v ∃P, ∃P− v ¬C, ∃P− v ¬F, P v Q}. Also let S =
{D(a),∃y1, y2[A(y1)∧P (y1, y2)],∃y1, y2[P (y1, y2)∧C(y2)]} be the secrecy set. Using the asser-
tion expansion rules in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, we get A∗ = {A(a), B(a),¬C(a),¬C(b),¬C(c),
D(a), E(a),¬F (a), ¬F (b),¬F (c), P (a, b), P (a, c), Q(a, b), Q(a, c)}. Using the secrecy closure
rules in Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, we get E = {A(a), D(a),¬C(b)}. Then graphs for A∗ and
A∗ \ E are given in Figure 2.8.
The following results show that no assertion in the envelope E is “logically reachable” from
outside the envelope.
Lemma 2.5.1. Let A∗ be a completed ABox obtained from Σ by first applying the rules in
Figure 2.1, then in Figure 2.2 and then rules in Figure 2.3 as specified in Section 2.3. Also,
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A,B,¬C
D,E,¬F
¬C,¬F
¬C,¬F
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P,Q
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B,¬C
E,¬F
¬F
¬C,¬F
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P,Q
A∗ \ E
Figure 2.8 The graphs of A∗ and A∗ \ E
let E be a set of assertions which is completed by first using rules in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, and
then rules in Figure 2.7. Then, the ABox A∗ \ E is completed.
Proof. We have to show that no rule in Figures 2.1, 2.2 or 2.3 is applicable to A∗ \ E. The
proof is by contradiction according to cases. In each case, there are several sub cases. To avoid
repetition, we give proof for one sub case.
- If vNL-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion A(a) ∈ A∗ \ E and a subsumption
A v L ∈ T such that L(a) /∈ A∗ \E. Since A∗ is completed, L(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, L(a) ∈ E.
This makes the v←NL-rule applicable, contrary to the assumption that E is completed.
- If vN∃-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We argue the
latter case. By assumption, A(a) ∈ A∗\E, A v ∃P− ∈ T and there is no b ∈ O∗ such that
P (b, a) ∈ A∗ \E. Since A∗ is completed, there is a c ∈ O∗ such that P (c, a) ∈ A∗. Hence
P (c, a) ∈ E. This makes the v←N∃-rule applicable, which contradicts to the assumption
that E is completed.
- If v∃L-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We consider
the latter case. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A∗ \E, ∃P− v L ∈ T and L(a) /∈ A∗ \E. Since
A∗ is completed, L(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, L(a) ∈ E. This makes the v←∃L-rule applicable, a
contradiction.
- If v∃∃-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−,
(iii) R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider case (ii). By assumption,
P (a, b) ∈ A∗ \E, ∃P v ∃Q− ∈ T and for all d ∈ O∗ such that Q(d, a) /∈ A∗ \E. Since A∗
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is completed, there is a c ∈ O∗ such that Q(c, a) ∈ A∗. Hence Q(c, a) ∈ E. This makes
the v←∃∃-rule applicable, contrary to the assumption that E is completed.
- If vRE-rule is applicable, we have eight cases (i) R = P,E = Q, (ii) R = P,E = Q−,
(iii) R = P−, E = Q, (iv) R = P−, E = Q−, (v) R = P,E = ¬Q, (vi) R = P,E = ¬Q−,
(vii) R = P−, E = ¬Q and (viii) R = P−, E = ¬Q−. We consider case (vii). By
assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A∗ \ E, P− v ¬Q ∈ T and ¬Q(a, b) /∈ A∗ \ E. Since A∗ is
completed, ¬Q(a, b) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬Q(a, b) ∈ E. This makes the v←RE-rule applicable, a
contradiction.
- If vN@-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We consider
the latter case. By assumption, A(a) ∈ A∗ \E, A v ¬∃P− ∈ T and ¬P (b, a) /∈ A∗ \E for
some b ∈ O∗. Since A∗ is completed, ¬P (b, a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬P (b, a) ∈ E. This makes
the v←N@-rule applicable, a contradiction.
- If v∃@-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−, (iii)
R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider case (iii). By assumption,
P (b, a) ∈ A∗ \ E, ∃P− v ¬∃Q ∈ T and ¬Q(a, c) /∈ A∗ \ E for some c ∈ O∗. Since A∗ is
completed, ¬Q(a, c) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬Q(a, c) ∈ E. This makes the v←∃@-rule applicable, a
contradiction.
- If vNL¬-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion ¬L(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, A v L ∈ T and
¬A(a) /∈ A∗ \E. Since A∗ is completed, ¬A(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬A(a) ∈ E. This makes the
v←NL¬-rule applicable, a contradiction.
- If vN∃¬-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We argue the
first case. By assumption, ∀b ∈ O∗, ¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗ \E, A v ∃P ∈ T and ¬A(a) /∈ A∗ \E.
Since A∗ is completed, ¬A(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬A(a) ∈ E. This makes the v←N∃¬-rule
applicable, a contradiction.
- If v∃L¬-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We argue the
second case. By assumption, ¬L(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, ∃P− v L ∈ T and ¬P (b, a) /∈ A∗ \ E, for
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some b ∈ O∗. Since A∗ is completed, ¬P (b, a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬P (b, a) ∈ E. This makes
the v←∃L¬-rule applicable, a contradiction.
- If v∃∃¬-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−,
(iii) R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider case (i). By assumption,
∀b ∈ O∗ ¬Q(a, b) ∈ A∗ \ E, ∃P v ∃Q ∈ T and ¬P (a, c) /∈ A∗ \ E for some c ∈ O∗.
Since A∗ is completed, ¬P (a, c) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬P (a, c) ∈ E. This makes the v∃∃¬-rule
applicable, a contradiction.
- If vRE¬-rule is applicable, we have eight cases (i) R = P,E = Q, (ii) R = P,E = Q−,
(iii) R = P−, E = Q, (iv) R = P−, E = Q−, (v) R = P,E = ¬Q, (vi) R = P,E = ¬Q−,
(vii) R = P−, E = ¬Q and (viii) R = P−, E = ¬Q−. We consider case (v). By
assumption, Q(a, b) ∈ A∗ \ E, P v ¬Q ∈ T and ¬P (a, b) /∈ A∗ \ E. Since A∗ is
completed, ¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬P (a, b) ∈ E. This makes the v←RE¬-rule applicable, a
contradiction.
- If vN@¬-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We argue the
second case. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A∗\E, A v ¬∃P− ∈ T and ¬A(a) /∈ A∗\E. Since
A∗ is completed, ¬A(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬A(a) ∈ E. This makes the v←N@¬-rule applicable,
a contradiction.
- If v∃@¬-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−,
(iii) R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider case (iv). By assumption,
Q(b, a) ∈ A∗ \ E and ∃P− v ¬∃Q− ∈ T such that ¬P (c, a) /∈ A∗ \ E for some c ∈ O∗.
Since A∗ is completed, ¬P (c, a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ¬P (c, a) ∈ E. This makes the v←∃@¬-rule
applicable, a contradiction. 
The following corollary states, roughly, that the secret BCQs are not logically reachable
from A∗ \ E.
Corollary 2.5.1. Let E′ be any subset of A∗ which is completed with respect to secrecy closure
rules listed in Figure 2.7. Then, for every q ∈ SCQ,
- there is no labeled graph homomorphism h : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E′], and
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- there exists at least one mapping f : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E′] which is not clashy.
Proof. Let E′ be completed with respect to secrecy closure rules listed in Figure 2.7. This
implies that for every q ∈ SCQ, no BCQh-rule is applicable to q. Hence, by the conditions of
BCQh-rule, there is no labeled graph homomorphism h : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E′], for any q ∈ SCQ.
Similarly, no BCQc-rule is applicable to q. It follows that for each q ∈ SCQ, there exist at least
one mapping f : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E′] which is not clashy. 
We now show that the completed set E (an output of ΛS), is in fact an envelope.
Theorem 2.5.1. E is an envelope for S.
Proof. We must show that the set E satisfies the properties of Definition 2.5.1. Clearly,
SΣ ⊆ E. First we show that, for every α ∈ E, A∗ \ E 6|=∗ α. Suppose A∗ \ E |=∗ α, for
some α ∈ E. By Theorem 2.3.2, we have α ∈ (A∗ \ E)∗ and by Lemma 2.5.1, α ∈ A∗ \ E, a
contradiction.
Next we show that for each q ∈ SCQ, A∗ \ E 6|=∗ q and A∗ \ E |6|=∗ q.
- Assume A∗ \E |=∗ q. Then, for every OW-model I = (∆, ·I) of (A∗ \E, T ), I∗ |= q where
I∗ = (∆∗ = I∗(O∗), ·I∗). Let J be the canonical model of A∗ \ E. Then, J ∗ = J , and
piJ : V [q] −→c ∆∗ = J (O∗) = O∗ and (J , piJ ) |= β, for every β ∈ Atoms(q).
Now, let v ∈ V [q] and A(v) ∈ Atoms(q). Then, (J , piJ ) |= A(v) ⇒ piJ (v) ∈ AJY ⇒
A(piJ (v)) ∈ A∗ \ E ⇒ A ∈ L[A∗ \ E](piJ (v)). Similarly, let u, v ∈ V [q] and P (u, v) ∈
Atoms(q). Then, (J , piJ ) |= P (u, v) ⇒ (piJ (u), piJ (v)) ∈ PJY ⇒ P ((piJ (u), piJ (v))) ∈
A∗ \ E ⇒ P ∈ L[A∗ \ E]((piJ (u), piJ (v))). It follows that, piJ : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] is a
labeled graph homomorphism contradicting Corollary 2.5.1.
- Assume A∗ \ E | |=∗ q. Then, for every OW-model I = (∆, ·I) of (A∗ \ E, T ), I∗| |=
q where I∗ = (∆∗ = I∗(O∗), ·I∗). Let J be the canonical model of A∗ \ E. Then,
J ∗ = J and for each valuation pi : V [q] −→c ∆∗ = J (O∗) = O∗, (J , pi) |= ¬β, for
some β ∈ Atoms(q). Let k be any such valuation. Then, (J , k) |= ¬A(v) for some
A(v) ∈ Atoms(q) or (J , k) |= ¬P (u, v) for some P (u, v) ∈ Atoms(q). In the first case,
k(v) ∈ AJN ⇒ ¬A(k(v)) ∈ A∗ \ E ⇒ ¬A ∈ L[A∗ \ E](k(v)) and in the second case,
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(k(u), k(v)) ∈ PJN ⇒ ¬P ((k(u), k(v))) ∈ A∗ \ E ⇒ ¬P ∈ L[A∗ \ E]((k(u), k(v))). Hence,
k : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] is clashy. Since k was arbitrary, it follows that all valuations are
clashy. However, E is completed, so by Corollary 2.5.1 there exist at least one mapping
k : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] which is not clashy. This is a contradiction. Hence, A∗ \ E |6|=∗ q.

Ideally, we would like to compute a minimum envelope E which makes query answering as
informative as possible without compromising the secrecy. But, computing minimum envelope
appears to be hard, see Tao et al. (2014). So, our focus now is to compute a minimal envelope
with the property that removing any one of the assertions in E would reveal some of the secrets.
We call such an envelope a tight envelope.
Definition 2.5.2. An envelope E is said to be tight if for every α ∈ E, E \ {α} is not an
envelope.
Next, we observe that an envelope computed using the rules in Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 need
not be tight.
Example 2.5.2. Consider a DL-LiteR KB, where A = {W (a, b),W (a, c)} and T = {∃W v
A,∃W− v B}. Let S = {∃y, z[A(y)∧W (y, z)∧B(z)]} be the secrecy set. Using the rules in Fig-
ure 1, we compute A∗ = {A(a), B(b), B(c),W (a, b),W (a, c)}. Since ΛS is a non-deterministic
algorithm, ΛS may output different envelopes. For illustration purposes, we considered two
envelopes namely E1 = {A(a),W (a, b),W (a, c)} and E2 = {W (a, b),W (a, c)}. It is easy to see
that E2 is tight, whereas E1 is not.
We now present a naive approach to compute a tight envelope. Given a precomputed A∗
and a secrecy set S = SΣ ∪ SCQ, we can compute an envelope E of S as explained in the
beginning of this section. An assertion α ∈ E \ S is said to be redundant if E \ {α} is an
envelope, i.e., ((A∗ \E)∪{α})∗∩ (E\{α}) = ∅. To compute a tight envelope, for each β ∈ E\S
we check whether β is redundant in which case it is moved from E to A∗ \ E. Otherwise, β
remains in E. Updating the resulting ABox A∗ \ E could possibly take exponential time.
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Figure 2.9 The graphs of A∗ \ E and queries
2.6 Answering Queries
At this point we assume that A∗ and E have been precomputed. From an algorithmic point
of view, answering queries may be based on checking membership in the set A∗ \E or searching
for specific graph structures in the graph G[A∗ \ E]. Suppose that the agent poses query q of
the form C(a) or E(a, b). Then, the reasoner checks for the membership of q and ¬q in the set
A∗ \E. If q ∈ A∗ \E, then the reasoner should answer “Yes” by Theorem 2.4.1. If ¬q ∈ A∗ \E,
then the reasoner should answer “No” by Theorem 2.4.2. If neither q nor ¬q is in A∗ \E, then
the reasoner should answer “Unknown”.
Now suppose that the agent poses BCQ q. Then, the reasoner considers the mappings
V [q] −→c V [A∗\E]. If there exists a labeled homomorphism h : V [q] −→c V [A∗\E], then the reasoner
should answer “Yes” by Theorem 2.4.1. If every such mapping is clashy, then the reasoner
should answer “No”, see Theorem 2.4.2. Otherwise, the reasoner should answer “Unknown”.
Example 2.6.1. We use the KB, the secrecy set S and the envelope E considered in Example
2.5.1. Answers for the BCQs q1, q2 and q3 whose query graphs are in Figure 2.9, are computed
in the following based on A∗ \ E.
First let us consider the BCQ q1 = ∃y1, y2[E(y1) ∧ Q(y1, y2)]. Since there exists a homo-
morphism from G[q1] to G[A∗ \ E], namely, y1 7→ a, y2 7→ b and since L[q1](y1) ⊆ L[A∗ \
E](a), L[q1](y1, y2) ⊆ L[A∗ \ E](a, b), L[q1](y2) ⊆ L[A∗ \ E](b), the answer to q1 is “Yes”.
Actually, there are two labeled homomorphisms from G[q1] to G[A∗ \ E], the other one being,
y1 7→ a, y2 7→ c.
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Next, q2 = ∃y1, y2[A(y1) ∧ Q(y1, y2)]. Since there is no labeled homomorphism and there exist
non-clashy mappings from G[q2] to G[A∗\E], e.g., y1 7→ a, y2 7→ b, answer to q2 is “Unknown”.
Finally, consider the BCQ q3 = ∃y1, y2[Q(y1, y2)∧F (y2)]. It is easy to see that all the mappings
from G[q3] to G[A∗ \ E] are clashy. Hence, answer for the BCQ q3 is “No”.
2.7 Complexities of computing A∗, E and Query Answering
Recall that answering conjunctive queries in DL-LiteR is in LogSpace with respect to data
complexity (i.e., as a function of the size of the ABox, keeping the TBox and query fixed), and
NP-complete with respect to combined complexity, (i.e., as a function of both the size of the
KB and the query) see Calvanese et al. (2007); Ortiz and Sˇimkus (2012). Here we provide a
brief discussion of the computational complexities of various algorithms given in this chapter.
a) Computation of the assertional closureA∗: Starting with the input ABoxA, the algorithm
expands it using the assertion expansion rules given in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 in that
order. Clearly, A∗ can be computed in exponential time as a function of the size of the
input KB.
b) Computation of the envelope E: Initializing the set E as SΣ , the algorithm first expands
E using the secrecy closure rules given in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. Further the algorithm
expands the resulting set E using the rules in Figure 8 for the BCQs in SCQ until no more
application of rules in Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 are possible. The most time-consuming
step in the computation of E is the application of the BCQh-rule which may require
an enumeration of all graph labeled homomorphisms h : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E]. This may
incur substantial computational cost; in fact enumerating all graph homomorphisms h :
V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] requires time exponential in the input size |V [q]| + |V [A∗ \ E]| as the
corresponding counting problem is #P -complete, see Dyer and Greenhill (2000).
It is important to note that since our main interest is in query-answering, the calculations (a)
and (b) need to be performed just once before the query-answer phase begins.
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c) Computation of answers to queries: It is obvious that the cost of computing an answer
to a BCQ is higher than the cost of answering an instance query. By Hidden Name
Assumption, the querying agent can ask instance queries about assertions in the set A∗0
whose size is of polynomial in the input KB, see Section 2.5. Hence, answering instance
queries can be done in polynomial time as a function of the size of the input KB.
For answering a BCQ q, the reasoner R computes a function which returns “Yes”, “No”
or “Unknown” in the following way: First R checks if there is a labeled homomorphism
h : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] in which case R answers “Yes”; if no such homomorphism exists,
R checks if there is a non-clashy mapping k : V [q] −→c V [A∗ \ E] in which case R answers
“Unknown”; otherwise, R outputs “No”.
It is known that the problem of existence of a labeled homomorphism h : V [q] −→c V [A∗\E]
is NP − complete and the problem of existence of a non-clashy mapping k : V [q] −→c
V [A∗ \ E] clearly belongs to NP . It is easy to see that these tests can be performed
deterministically in |V [A∗ \E]|O(|V [q]|) time. Observe that this upper bound is polynomial
in the KB size (when the query is fixed) and it is exponential in the query size (when KB
is fixed).
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the problem of secrecy-preserving query answering over
acyclic DL-LiteR KBs. We have extended the conceptual logic-based framework for secrecy-
preserving reasoning which was introduced by Tao et al., see Tao et al. (2014), so as to allow
BCQs. As the OWA underlies the foundational aspects of KBs, to show that the reasoner is
sound and complete we used the semantics based on Kleene’s 3-valued logic, see Avron (1991);
Tao et al. (2014). We provide syntactic characterizations for entailment and disentailment of
BCQs in terms of properties of mappings (Section 2.4).
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CHAPTER 3. SECRECY-PRESERVING QUERY ANSWERING IN ELH
KNOWLEDGE BASES
3.1 Introduction
In literature, most of the approaches dealing with “information protection” are based on
access control mechanisms. For semantic web applications, the authors of Kagal et al. (2003)
have proposed policy languages to represent obligation and delegation policies based on access
control approach. Biskup et al. in Biskup and Weibert (2008); Biskup and Tadros (2012) stud-
ied secrecy in incomplete databases using controlled query evaluation (CQE). Since description
logics (DLs) underlie web ontology languages (OWLs), recently researchers have shown an
interest in studying secrecy-preserving reasoning in DL knowledge bases (KBs).
In Bao et al. (2007); Tao et al. (2010, 2014), the authors have developed a secrecy framework
that attempts to satisfy the following competing goals: (a) it protects secret information and
(b) queries are answered as informatively as possible (subject to satisfying property (a)). The
notion of an envelope to hide secret information against logical inference was first defined
and used in Tao et al. (2010). Further, in Tao et al. (2014), Tao et al., introduced a more
elaborate conceptual framework for secrecy-preserving query answering (SPQA) under Open
World Assumption (OWA) with multiple querying agents. This approach is based on OWA and
(so far) it has been restricted to instance-checking queries. Specifically, in Bao et al. (2007);
Tao et al. (2010, 2014) the main idea was to utilize the secret information within the reasoning
process, but then answering “Unknown” whenever the answer is truly unknown or in case the
true answer could compromise confidentiality.
The motivation for this work is that popular ontologies like GALEN, GO and SNOMED
that can be viewed as KBs defined in languages belong to EL family. In addition, a number
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of studies were reported in conjunctive query answering, reasoning and classifications in ELH
and its extensions, see Bienvenu et al. (2013); Delaitre and Kazakov (2009).
In this chapter we extend the work of Tao et al., reported in Tao et al. (2010), to the ELH
language. In addition to the extension, we make several new contributions. First, we study
secrecy in the context of assertions as well as general concept inclusions (GCIs). To the best of
our knowledge, secrecy-preserving reasoning for GCIs has not been studied before. As a first
step in constructing SPQA system, we design two tableau algorithms to compute finite sets T ∗
and thenA∗, of consequences of the TBox T ∪R∗ and the KB 〈A, T ∗,R∗〉 respectively, restricted
to individuals and concepts that actually occur in the given KB Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 and an extra
“auxiliary” set of concepts defined over the signature of Σ. The approach to constructing SPQA
system presented in this chapter is quite different from Tao et al. (2010). In Tao et al. (2010), the
KB and envelope are expanded with new queries. This makes the subsequent query answering
step more and more complicated. In general, the sets of all assertional consequences and GCI
consequences of a given Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 may be infinite. By forcing the tableau algorithms
to compute the consequences (both assertions and GCIs) of KB restricted to individuals and
subconcepts that occur in a given prescribed set, we obtain finite A∗ and T ∗ that in fact can
be computed efficiently in polynomial time. These sets, once computed, remain fixed and are
not modified. The two tableau algorithms are sound and complete under the restrictions stated
above, see section 3.3. Since the sets A∗ and T ∗ do not contain all the consequences of the KB,
in order to answer user queries we have designed recursive algorithms which break the queries
into smaller assertions or GCIs all the way until the information in the sets A∗ and T ∗ can be
used. In effect, we have split the task of query answering into two parts: in the first part we
compute all the consequences of Σ restricted to concepts and individuals that occur in Σ, in
the second part we use a recursive algorithm to evaluate more complex queries with the base
case that has been computed in the first part.
In more detail, starting from the secrecy sets SA (of assertions) and ST (of GCIs), we
compute finite sets of assertions and GCIs, viz., the envelopes EA ⊆ A∗ of SA and ET ⊆ T ∗ of
ST respectively. These envelopes are computed by two tableau algorithms based on the idea
of inverting the expansion rules of two tableau algorithms listed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The
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idea behind the envelope concept is that no expression in the envelope can be logically deduced
from information outside the envelope. Once such envelopes are computed, the answers to the
queries are censored whenever the queries belong to the envelopes. Since, generally, an envelope
for a given secrecy set is not unique, the developer can force the algorithm to output a specific
envelope from the available choices satisfying the needs of application domain, company policy,
social obligations and user preferences.
Next, we discuss query answering procedures which allow us answer queries without reveal-
ing secrets. Usually in SPQA framework queries are answered by checking their membership
(a) in A∗ \ EA if the query is an assertion; and (b) in T ∗ \ ET if the query is a GCI. Since A∗
and T ∗ do not contain all the statements entailed by Σ, we need to extend the query answering
procedure from just membership checking. Towards that end we designed two recursive algo-
rithms to answer more complicated assertion and GCI queries. To answer an assertion query
q, the algorithm first checks if q ∈ A∗ \ EA in which case the answer is “Yes”; otherwise, the
given query is broken into subqueries based on the constructors, and the algorithm is applied
recursively on the subqueries, see section 3.5. This query answering procedure runs in poly-
nomial time in the size of the KB and the query q. Similar approach is used to answer GCI
queries.
3.2 Syntax and Semantics
A vocabulary of ELH is a triple < NO, NC , NR > of countably infinite, pairwise disjoint
sets. The elements of NO are called object (or individual) names, the elements of NC are called
concept names and the elements of NR are called role names. The set of ELH concepts is
denoted by C and is defined by the following rules
C ::= A | > | C uD | ∃r.C
where A ∈ NC , r ∈ NR, > denotes the “top concept”, and C,D ∈ C. Assertions are expressions
of the form C(a) or r(a, b), general concept inclusions (GCIs) are expressions of the form C v D
and role inclusions are expressions of the form r v s where C,D ∈ C, r, s ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO.
The semantics of ELH concepts is specified, as usual, by an interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉 where ∆
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is the domain of the interpretation, and ·I is an interpretation function mapping each a ∈ NO
to an element aI ∈ ∆, each A ∈ NC to a subset AI ⊆ ∆, and each r ∈ NR to a binary relation
rI ⊆ ∆×∆. The interpretation function ·I is extended inductively to all ELH concepts in the
usual manner:
>I = ∆; (C uD)I = CI ∩DI ;
(∃r.C)I = {d ∈ ∆ | ∃e ∈ CI : (d, e) ∈ rI}.
An Abox A is a finite, non-empty set of assertions. A TBox T is a finite set of GCIs and an
RBox R is a finite set of role inclusions. An ELH KB is a triple Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 where A is
an ABox, T is a TBox and R is an RBox. Let I = 〈∆, ·I〉 be an interpretation, C,D ∈ C,
r, s ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO. We say that I satisfies C(a), r(a, b), C v D or r v s, notation
I |= C(a), I |= r(a, b), I |= C v D or I |= r v s if, respectively, aI ∈ CI , (aI , bI) ∈ rI ,
CI ⊆ DI or rI ⊆ sI . I is a model of Σ, notation I |= Σ, if I satisfies all the assertions in
A, all the GCIs in T and all the role inclusions in R. Let α be an assertion, a GCI or a role
inclusion. We say that Σ entails α, notation Σ |= α, if all models of Σ satisfy α.
3.3 Computation of A∗ and T ∗
Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be an ELH KB. In this section, we give two tableau algorithms that
compute A∗, a set of assertional consequence of Σ, and T ∗ a set of GCI consequences of Σ,
both restricted to concepts that occur in Σ. We assume that all RBoxes are acyclic. Before
computing T ∗ and A∗, we compute R∗ = R+ ∪ R◦, where R+ is the transitive closure of R
with respect to role inclusion and R◦ = {r v r | r occurs in Σ}. As an example, consider
a KB Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 where ABox A = {A(a), ∃m.B(c)}, TBox T = {A v ∃n.D} and RBox
R = {r v s, p v q, u v v, s v u}. Then, R∗ = R ∪ {s v v, r v u, r v v} ∪ {m v m,n v
n, r v r, s v s, p v p, q v q, u v u, v v v}. R∗ is easily computed in polynomial time and we
omit the details.
Computation of T ∗: Denote by NΣ the set of all concept names and role names occurring
in Σ and let S be a finite set of concepts over the symbol set NΣ . Let CΣ,S be the set of
all subconcepts of concepts that occur in either S or Σ. Given Σ and CΣ,S, we describe a
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Tv − rule : if C v D ∈ T ∗, D v E ∈ T and C v E /∈ T ∗,
then T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C v E};
T−u − rule : if C v D u E ∈ T ∗, and C v D /∈ T ∗ or C v E /∈ T ∗,
then T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C v D,C v E};
T+u − rule : if C v D, C v E ∈ T ∗, D u E ∈ CΣ,S and C v D u E /∈ T ∗,
then T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C v D u E};
T+H − rule : if C v ∃r.D, D v E ∈ T ∗, r v s ∈ R∗, ∃s.E ∈ CΣ,S and C v ∃s.E /∈ T ∗,
then T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C v ∃s.E}.
Figure 3.1 TBox Tableau expansion rules
procedure that computes T ∗, a set of GCI consequences of the given KB Σ (restricted to
concepts in CΣ,S). That is, T ∗ = {C v D | C,D ∈ CΣ,S and Σ |= C v D}. This procedure is
similar to the calculus presented in Kazakov et al. (2014) (designed for EL+).
Let AXT = {C v C,C v >,> v > | C ∈ CΣ,S}. T ∗ is initialized as AXT and then
expanded by exhaustively applying expansion rules listed in Figure 3.1. The Tv-rule derives
a GCI based on transitivity of subsumption. T−u -rule derives new GCIs by decomposing con-
junction concepts into its two conjuncts. The T+u -rule is just the “opposite” of the T
−
u -rule.
Finally, T+H -rule derives GCIs based on concept and role inclusions.
A TBox is completed if no expansion rule in Figure 3.1 is applicable to it. We denote by
ΛT the algorithm which, given Σ, CΣ,S and R∗, non-deterministically applies expansion rules
in Figure 3.1 until no further applications are possible. Since ΛT has been restricted to derive
GCIs whose left and right hand side concept expressions occur in CΣ,S, the size of the T ∗ is
at most a polynomial in the size of its input. Hence, the running time of ΛT is polynomial in
| Σ | + | CΣ,S |. The correctness of ΛT can be shown by proving soundness and completeness
of ΛT . The soundness proof is obvious.
Example 3.3.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH KB, where A = {C(a), r(b, a),∃u.A(d)}, T =
{A v B,C v D u E,F v ∃u.B} and R = {u v v}. Then, R∗ = {r v r, u v u, v v v, u v v}.
Thus, applying rules in Figure 3.1 to T , we get {> v >, A v >, C v C,∃u.A v ∃u.A,∃u.A v
∃u.B, C v D,C v D u E} ⊆ T ∗. 
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To prove the completeness of ΛT , we define the canonical interpretation J =
〈
∆, ·J 〉 for a
completed TBox T ∗ and an RBox R∗ as follows:
∆ = {wC | C ∈ CΣ,S};
>J = ∆;
for A ∈ NC , AJ = {wC | C v A ∈ T ∗};
for r ∈ NR, rJ = {(wC , wD) | C v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗} ∪⋃
uvr∈R∗ u
J .
The interpretation function ·J is extended to concept expressions as usual. To prove that J is
a model of T ∗, we need the following definition and technical lemma.
Definition 3.3.1. Let J be the canonical interpretation and u a role name that occurs in Σ.
u is said to be minimal with respect to (wG, wH) ∈ ∆×∆ if
1) (wG, wH) ∈ uJ and
2) there is no v that occurs in R such that v 6= u, (wG, wH) ∈ vJ and v v u ∈ R∗.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let B, C ∈ CΣ,S. Then,
(a) wC ∈ CJ .
(b) wC ∈ BJ if and only if C v B ∈ T ∗.
Proof. (a) By induction on the structure of C.
- C = A ∈ NC or C = >, the claim follows from the definition of J .
- C = DuE. Then, DuE v DuE ∈ T ∗ and by the T−u -rule, we have DuE v D,DuE v
E ∈ T ∗, whence wDuE ∈ DJ and wDuE ∈ EJ , by inductive hypothesis. By the semantics
of u, wDuE ∈ DJ ∩ EJ = (D u E)J .
- C = ∃r.D. Then, ∃r.D v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗ and by the definition of J , (w∃r.D, wD) ∈ rJ ; also,
by the inductive hypothesis, wD ∈ DJ . By the semantics of ∃, w∃r.D ∈ (∃r.D)J .
(b) (⇐) By induction on the structure of B.
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- B ∈ NC . Then, C v B ∈ T ∗ whence wC ∈ BJ , by the definition of J .
- B = >, the claim follows from the definition of J .
- B = D u E. Then, C v D u E ∈ T ∗. By T−u -rule, C v D, C v E ∈ T ∗ implies
wC ∈ DJ and wC ∈ EJ , and by the inductive hypothesis whence wC ∈ (D u E)J = BJ ,
by the semantics of u.
- B = ∃r.D. We assume, C v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗. Since C, D ∈ CΣ,S, we have wC , wD ∈ ∆. By
the definition of J , (wC , wD) ∈ rJ . By part (a), wD ∈ DJ hence wC ∈ (∃r.D)J = BJ ,
by the semantics of ∃.
(⇒) By induction on the structure of B.
- When B ∈ NC , the claim follows from the definition of J .
- B = >, the claim follows from the definition of AXT .
- B = D u E. Then, wC ∈ (D u E)J ⇒ wC ∈ DJ and wC ∈ EJ ⇒ C v D,C v E ∈ T ∗,
by inductive hypothesis. Since DuE occurs in CΣ,S, by the T+u -rule, we have C v DuE =
B ∈ T ∗.
- B = ∃r.D. Then, wC ∈ (∃r.D)J ⇒ there is an element wE ∈ ∆ such that (wC , wE) ∈
rJ , wE ∈ DJ . By inductive hypothesis, E v D ∈ T ∗. Now, we have two subcases
depending on a “manner” in which (wC , wE) entered r
J .
- If r is minimal with respect to (wC , wE), then, by the definition of J and Definition
3.3.1, C v ∃r.E ∈ T ∗. Since r v r ∈ R∗, by the T+H-rule, we have C v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗.
Hence, C v B ∈ T ∗.
- If r is not minimal, then (wC , wE) ∈ uJ , u 6= r and u v r ∈ R∗ for some u
that occurs in R. If u is minimal with respect to (wC , wE), then by previous case
C v ∃u.E ∈ T ∗ and by the T+H-rule, we have C v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗. Hence, C v B ∈ T ∗.
If u is not minimal with respect to (wC , wE), since RBox R is acyclic, there exists a
chain v v v1 v v2...... v vk v u in R such that v is minimal with respect to (wC , wE).
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Since R∗ is the transitive closure of R, v v r ∈ R∗. Again by the previous case,
C v ∃v.E ∈ T ∗. By T+H-rule, we have C v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗. Hence, C v B ∈ T ∗. 
The following lemma claims that J satisfies T ∗ and R∗. The proof is a consequence of
Lemma 3.3.1
Lemma 3.3.2. J |= T ∗ ∪R∗ .
The completeness of ΛT now follows by an easy argument.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let Σ be a ELH KB and let T ∗ be the completed TBox. For any C, D
∈ CΣ,S, if Σ |= C v D then C v D ∈ T ∗.
Proof. Suppose C v D /∈ T ∗, i.e., by part (b) of Lemma 3.3.1, wC /∈ DJ . On the other hand
by part (a) of Lemma 3.3.1, wC ∈ CJ and this implies that J 6|= C v D. Since by Lemma
3.3.2, J |= T ∗, and since T ⊆ T ∗, we obtain Σ 6|= C v D. 
Computation of A∗: Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be an ELH KB, R∗ be defined as at the beginning
of this section and T ∗ be the completed TBox as computed previously. Also, let OΣ be the set
of individual names that occur in Σ and define AXA = {>(a) | a ∈ OΣ}.
We outline the procedure that computes A∗, the set of assertional consequences of Σ∗
where Σ∗ = 〈A, T ∗,R∗〉, restricted to the concepts and role names that occur in CΣ,S and Σ
respectively. That is
A∗ = {C(a) | C ∈ CΣ,S and Σ∗ |= C(a)} ∪ {r(a, b) | r occurs in Σ and Σ∗ |= r(a, b)}.
A∗ is initialized as A ∪ AXA and is expanded by exhaustively applying rules listed in Figure
3.2. A−u -rule decomposes conjunctions, and the Av-rule derives assertions based on the GCIs
present in T ∗. To build new concept assertions whose concept expressions already occur in
CΣ,S, we use the A+u and A+∃ -rules. Similarly, the A+∃H -rule derives concept assertions based
on role inclusions. It is important to note that this procedure does not introduce any fresh
individual names into A∗. Thus some assertions of the form ∃r.C(a) may not have “syntactic
witnesses”. Finally, the AH -rule derives role assertions based on role inclusions.
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A−u − rule : if C uD(a) ∈ A∗, and C(a) /∈ A∗ or D(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {C(a), D(a)};
A+u − rule : if C(a), D(a) ∈ A∗, C uD ∈ CΣ,S and C uD(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {C uD(a)};
A+∃ − rule : if r(a, b), C(b) ∈ A∗, ∃r.C ∈ CΣ,S and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {∃r.C(a)};
Av − rule : if C(a) ∈ A∗, C v D ∈ T ∗, and D(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {D(a)};
A+∃H − rule : if ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗, r v s ∈ R∗, C v D ∈ T ∗, ∃s.D ∈ CΣ,S and ∃s.D(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {∃s.D(a)};
AH − rule : if r(a, b) ∈ A∗, r v s ∈ R∗, and s(a, b) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {s(a, b)}.
Figure 3.2 ABox Tableau expansion rules.
An ABox is completed if no expansion rule in Figure 3.2 is applicable to it. We denote by
ΛA the algorithm which, given A, R∗, T ∗ and CΣ,S, non-deterministic-ally applies expansion
rules in Figure 3.2 until no further applications are possible. Since ΛA derives only assertions
involving concept expressions that occur in CΣ,S, it is easy to see that the running time of ΛA
is polynomial in | Σ | + | CΣ,S |.
Example 3.3.2. (Example 3.3.1 cont.) Recall that Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH be the given KB,
R∗ the computed RBox and T ∗ the completed TBox. Then, by applying rules in Figure 3.2 to
A and using T ∗ and R∗ we get,
A∗ = {>(a),>(b),>(d),∃u.A(d),∃u.B(d), C(a),
r(b, a), D(a), E(a), D u E(a)}. 
The correctness of ΛA can be shown by proving its soundness and completeness. The sound-
ness is obvious. To prove the completeness of ΛA, we first define the canonical interpretation
K = 〈∆, ·K〉 for a completed ABox A∗. The definition of K is similar to the definition of canon-
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ical model IK presented in Lutz et al. (2008). Define the witness set, W = {wC | C ∈ CΣ,S}.
∆ = OΣ ∪W;
aK = a,where a ∈ OΣ ;
>K = ∆;
for each A ∈ NC ,
AK = {a ∈ OΣ | A(a) ∈ A∗} ∪ {wC ∈ W | C v A ∈ T ∗}; for each r ∈ NR,
rK = {(a, b) ∈ OΣ ×OΣ | r(a, b) ∈ A∗} ∪ {(a,wC) ∈ OΣ ×W | ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗}
∪ {(wC , wD) ∈ W ×W | C v ∃r.D ∈ T ∗} ∪
⋃{uK | u v r ∈ R∗}.
K is extended to compound concepts in the usual way. We argue that K is a model of A∗, T ∗
and R∗.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let a, b ∈ OΣ and suppose that the role name r occurs in Σ. If (a, b) ∈ rK,
then r(a, b) ∈ A∗.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses. We prove the claim by induction on how r(a, b) has been
generated by ΛA. The base case, when r(a, b) ∈ A, is trivial. Let (a, b) ∈ uK with u v r ∈ R∗.
Then by induction hypothesis, u(a, b) ∈ A∗ and by the AH-rule, we have r(a, b) ∈ A∗. 
We state the following lemma whose proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.3.1.
Lemma 3.3.4. Let B, C ∈ CΣ,S. Then,
(a) wC ∈ CK.
(b) wC ∈ BK if and only if C v B ∈ T ∗.
The following definition is similar to Definition 3.3.1, but is based on the canonical inter-
pretation of the ABox A∗.
Definition 3.3.2. Let K be the canonical interpretation, and u a role name that occurs in Σ.
u is said to be minimal with respect to (a, b) if
1) (a, b) ∈ uK and
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2) there is no role name, v that occurs in R such that v 6= u, (a, b) ∈ vK and v v u ∈ R∗.
Lemma 3.3.5. Let a ∈ OΣ and B ∈ CΣ,S. If a ∈ BK, then B(a) ∈ A∗.
Proof. By induction on the structure of B.
- When B ∈ NC , the claim follows directly from the definition of K.
- When B = >, the claim follows from the definition of AXA.
- B = CuD. Then, a ∈ (CuD)K ⇒ a ∈ CK and a ∈ DK ⇒ C(a), D(a) ∈ A∗, by inductive
hypothesis. Since C uD occurs in CΣ,S, by the A+u -rule, we have C uD(a) = B(a) ∈ A∗.
- B = ∃r.C. Then, a ∈ (∃r.C)K implies that there is an element b ∈ ∆ such that (a, b) ∈ rK
and b ∈ CK. There are two cases.
- b ∈ OΣ. Since r occurs in Σ and C occurs in CΣ,S, by Lemma 3.3.3, we have
r(a, b) ∈ A∗ and by the inductive hypothesis, C(b) ∈ A∗. Since ∃r.C occurs in CΣ,S,
by the A+∃ -rule, we have ∃r.C(a) = B(a) ∈ A∗.
- b = wD ∈ W for some D ∈ CΣ,S. Then, we have (a,wD) ∈ rK and wD ∈ CK. By
part (b) of Lemma 3.3.1, D v C ∈ T ∗. Now, we have two subcases depending on a
manner in which (a,wD) entered r
K.
- If r is minimal with respect to (a,wD), then, by the definition of K and Definition
3.3.2, ∃r.D(a) ∈ A∗. Since r v r ∈ R∗, by the A+∃H-rule, we have ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗,
i.e., B(a) ∈ A∗.
- If r is not minimal, then (a,wD) ∈ uK, u 6= r and u v r ∈ R∗ for some u
that occurs in R. If u is minimal with respect to (a,wD), then by previous case
∃u.D(a) ∈ A∗. By A+∃H-rule, we have ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, B(a) ∈ A∗. If
u is not minimal with respect to (a,wD), since RBox R is acyclic, there exists
a chain v v v1 v v2...... v vk v u in R such that v is minimal with respect
to (a,wE). Since R∗ is the transitive closure of R, v v r ∈ R∗. Again by
the previous case, ∃v.D(a) ∈ A∗. By A+∃H-rule, we have ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗, i.e.,
B(a) ∈ A∗. 
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Lemma 3.3.6. If B(a) ∈ A∗, then a ∈ BK.
Proof. Again we use induction on the structure of B.
- B ∈ NC . Then, B(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ a ∈ BK, by the definition of K.
- B = >. The claim follows from the definition of K.
- B = C u D. Then, C u D(a) ∈ A∗. By A−u -rule, we have C(a), D(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ a ∈
CK and a ∈ DK ⇒ a ∈ (C uD)K, by inductive hypothesis.
- B = ∃r.D. Then, ∃r.D(a) ∈ A∗. By the definition of K, (a,wD) ∈ rK. By Lemma 3.3.1,
wD ∈ DK. Hence, by the semantics of ∃, a ∈ (∃r.D)K = BK. 
In the following we prove that K satisfies A∗, T ∗ and R∗.
Lemma 3.3.7. K |= A∗ ∪ T ∗ ∪R∗ .
Proof. It follows immediately from the definition of K that K |= R∗. Next, we show that K
satisfies A∗. C(a) ∈ A∗; then, by Lemma 3.3.6, a ∈ CK, i.e., K |= C(a). For r(a, b) ∈ A∗,
K |= r(a, b), by the definition of K. Hence K |= A∗.
Now, we show that K satisfies T ∗. Let F v G ∈ T ∗ and a ∈ FK. We have two cases.
- a ∈ OΣ. Then, by Lemma 3.3.5, F (a) ∈ A∗. Since A∗ is completed, by the Av-rule, we
get G(a) ∈ A∗. By Lemma 3.3.6, a ∈ GK. Hence, K |= F v G.
- a = wC ∈ W for some C ∈ CΣ,S. This implies, by the definition of K, that C v F ∈ T ∗.
Since T ∗ is completed, we have C v G ∈ T ∗. Again by the definition of K, a ∈ GK which
implies K |= F v G. 
We are ready to prove the completeness of ΛA.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let Σ∗ = 〈A, T ∗,R∗〉 be a ELH KB as defined in the beginning of this
subsection and A∗ the completed ABox. Suppose that B ∈ CΣ,S and r occurs in Σ. Then, for
any a, b ∈ OΣ,
- Σ∗ |= B(a) ⇒ B(a) ∈ A∗.
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- Σ∗ |= r(a, b) ⇒ r(a, b) ∈ A∗.
Proof. Since A ⊆ A∗, by Lemma 3.3.7, we have K |= Σ∗. We show that K 6|= B(a) and
K 6|= r(a, b). Assume that B(a) /∈ A∗. Then, a /∈ BK by Lemma 3.3.5 and hence K 6|= B(a).
Now, assume that r(a, b) /∈ A∗. Then, (a, b) /∈ rK by Lemma 3.3.3 and hence K 6|= r(a, b). 
3.4 Secrecy-Preserving Reasoning
Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be an ELH KB. Also let SA ⊆ A∗ \ AXA and ST ⊆ T ∗ \ AXT be
the “secrecy sets”. Given Σ, SA and ST , the objective is to answer assertion or GCI queries
while preserving secrecy. Our approach is to compute two sets EA and ET , where SA ⊆ EA ⊆
A∗ \AXA and ST ⊆ ET ⊆ T ∗ \AXT , called the secrecy envelopes for SA and ST respectively,
so that protecting EA and ET , the querying agent cannot logically infer any assertion in SA
and any GCI in ST , see Tao et al. (2010) where the DL language is just EL and secrecy is
restricted to membership assertions. Similarly, Tao et al. (2014) presents a general framework
for secrecy preserving reasoning.
The role of OWA in answering the queries is the following: When answering a query with
“Unknown”, the querying agent should not be able to distinguish between the case that the
answer to the query is truly unknown to the KB reasoner and the case that the answer is being
protected for reasons of secrecy. We envision a situation in which once the ABox A∗ and TBox
T ∗ are computed, a reasoner R is associated with it. R is designed to answer queries as follows:
If a query cannot be inferred from Σ, the answer is “Unknown”. If it can be inferred and it is
not in EA ∪ET , the answer is “Yes”; otherwise, the answer is “Unknown”. Note that since the
syntax of ELH does not include negation, an ELH KB cannot entail a negative query.
We make the following assumptions about the capabilities of the querying agent:
(a) does not have direct access to the KB Σ, but is aware of the underlying vocabulary,
(b) can ask queries in the form of assertions or GCIs, and
(c) cannot ask queries in the form of role inclusions.
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Inv-A−u − rule : if {C(a), D(a)} ∩ EA 6= ∅ and C uD(a) ∈ A∗ \ EA,
then EA := EA ∪ {C uD(a)};
Inv-A+u − rule : if C uD(a) ∈ EA, C uD ∈ CΣ,S and {C(a), D(a)} ⊆ A∗ \ EA,
then EA := EA ∪ {C(a)} or EA := EA ∪ {D(a)};
Inv-A+∃ − rule : if ∃r.C(a) ∈ EA, {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ EA and ∃r.C ∈ CΣ,S,
then EA := EA ∪ {r(a, b)} or EA := EA ∪ {C(b)};
Inv-Av − rule : if D(a) ∈ EA, C v D ∈ T ∗, and C(a) ∈ A∗ \ EA,
then EA := EA ∪ {C(a)};
Inv-A+∃H − rule : if ∃s.D(a) ∈ EA, C v D ∈ T ∗, r v s ∈ R∗, ∃s.D ∈ CΣ,S and
∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ \ EA, then EA := EA ∪ {∃r.C(a)};
Inv-AH − rule : if s(a, b) ∈ EA, r v s ∈ R∗, and r(a, b) ∈ A∗ \ EA,
then EA := EA ∪ {r(a, b)}.
Figure 3.3 Inverted ABox Tableau expansion rules
We formally define the notion of an envelope in the following.
Definition 3.4.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH KB, and let SA and ST be two finite secrecy
sets. The secrecy envelopes EA and ET of SA and ST respectively, have the following properties:
- SA ⊆ EA ⊆ A∗ \AXA,
- ST ⊆ ET ⊆ T ∗ \AXT ,
- for every α ∈ ET , T ∗ \ ET 6|= α, and
- for every α ∈ EA, A∗ \ EA 6|= α.
The intuition for the above definition is that no information in EA and ET can be inferred
from the corresponding sets A∗ \ EA and T ∗ \ ET . To compute envelopes, we use the idea of
inverting the rules of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 (see Tao et al. (2010), where this approach was first
utilized for membership assertions). Induced by the TBox and ABox expansion rules in Figures
3.1 and 3.2, we define the corresponding “inverted” ABox and TBox expansion rules in Figures
3.3 and 3.4, respectively. These inverted expansion rules are denoted by prefixing Inv- to the
name of the corresponding expansion rules.
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From now on, we assume that A∗, T ∗ and R∗ have been computed and readily available for
computing the envelopes. The computation of envelopes proceeds in two steps. In the first step,
we compute EA by initializing it to SA and then expanding it using the inverted expansion rules
listed in Figure 3.3 until no further applications are possible. We denote by ΛSA the algorithm
which computes the set EA. Due to non-determinism in applying the rules Inv-A+u and Inv-A+∃ ,
different executions of ΛSA may result in different outputs. Since A∗ is finite, the computation
of ΛSA terminates. Let EA be an output of ΛSA. Since the size of A∗ is polynomial in |Σ|+ |CΣ,S|,
and each application of inverted expansion rule moves some assertions from A∗ into EA, the
size of EA is at most the size of A∗. Therefore ΛSA takes polynomial time in | Σ | + | CΣ,S | to
compute the envelope EA.
In step two, we compute ET independent of EA by initializing it to ST and then expanding
it using the inverted TBox expansion rules listed in Figure 3.4 until no further applications of
rules are possible. We denote by ΛST the algorithm which computes the set ET . Similarly to
ΛSA, due to non-determinism in applying Inv-T
+
u and Inv-T
+
H -rules, different executions of Λ
S
T
may result in different outputs. Since T ∗ is finite, the computation of ΛST terminates. Let ET
be an output of ΛST . Since the size of T ∗ is polynomial in the size of Σ and CΣ,S, and each
application of inverted TBox expansion rule moves some GCIs from T ∗ into ET , the size of ET
is at most the size of T ∗. Therefore ΛST takes polynomial time in | Σ | + | CΣ,S | to compute
the envelope ET .
Example 3.4.1. (Example 3.3.2 cont.) Recall that A∗ and T ∗ are the completed ABox and
TBox respectively. Let SA = {D uE(a)} and ST = {C v D uE} be the secrecy sets. Then, by
using rules in Figure 3.3, we get the envelope for SA,
EA = SA ∪ {D(a)}.
Similarly, using the rules in Figure 3.4, we get the envelope for ST ,
ET = ST ∪ {C v D}. 
Before proving the main results on envelopes, we prove the following auxiliary lemmas.
First, we show that no assertions in EA is “logically reachable” from any assertion in A∗ \EA.
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Inv-Tv − rule : if C v E ∈ ET , D v E ∈ T and C v D ∈ T ∗ \ ET ,
then ET := ET ∪ {C v D};
Inv-T−u − rule : if {C v D,C v E} ∩ ET 6= ∅ and C v D u E ∈ T ∗ \ ET ,
then ET := ET ∪ {C v D u E};
Inv-T+u − rule : if C v D u E ∈ ET , D u E ∈ CΣ,S and {C v D,C v E} ⊆ T ∗ \ ET ,
then ET := ET ∪ {C v D} or ET := ET ∪ {C v E};
Inv-T+H − rule : if C v ∃s.E ∈ ET , r v s ∈ R∗,∃s.E ∈ CΣ,S and
{C v ∃r.D,D v E} ⊆ T ∗ \ ET ,
then ET := ET ∪ {C v ∃r.D} or ET := ET ∪ {D v E}.
Figure 3.4 Inverted TBox Tableau expansion rules.
Lemma 3.4.1. Let A∗ be a completed ABox obtained from A by applying the tableau expansion
rules in Figure 3.2. Also, let EA be a set of assertions which is completed by applying the
tableau expansion rules in Figure 3.3 starting with the secrecy set SA. Then, the ABox A∗ \EA
is completed.
Proof. We have to show that no rule in Figure 3.2 is applicable to A∗ \ EA. The proof is by
contradiction according to cases: assuming that a rule in Figure 3.2 is applicable and showing
that a some inverse rule is applicable.
- If A−u -rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C u D(a) ∈ A∗ \ EA such that
C(a) /∈ A∗ \ EA or D(a) /∈ A∗ \ EA. Since A∗ is completed, {C(a), D(a)} ⊆ A∗. Hence,
{C(a), D(a)} ∩ EA 6= ∅. This makes the Inv-A−u -rule applicable.
- If A+u -rule is applicable, then there are assertions C(a), D(a) ∈ A∗ \ EA such that C u
D ∈ CΣ,S and C u D(a) /∈ A∗ \ EA. Since A∗ is completed, C u D(a) ∈ A∗. Hence,
C uD(a) ∈ EA. This makes the Inv-A+u -rule applicable.
- If A+∃ -rule is applicable, then there are assertions r(a, b), C(b) ∈ A∗ \EA such that ∃r.C ∈
CΣ,S and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A∗\EA. Since A∗ is completed, ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ∃r.C(a) ∈ EA.
This makes the Inv-A+∃ -rule applicable.
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- If Av-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C(a) ∈ A∗\EA and a GCI C v D ∈ T ∗
such that D(a) /∈ A∗ \ EA. Since A∗ is completed, D(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, D(a) ∈ EA. This
makes the Inv-Av-rule applicable.
- If A+∃H-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ \ EA, a GCI C v D ∈
T ∗, a role inclusion r v s ∈ R∗ such that ∃s.D ∈ CΣ,S and ∃s.D(a) /∈ A∗ \ EA. Since
A∗ is completed, ∃s.D(a) ∈ A∗. Hence, ∃s.D(a) ∈ EA. This makes the Inv-A+∃H-rule
applicable.
- If AH-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion r(a, b) ∈ A∗ \ EA and a role inclusion
r v s ∈ R∗ such that s(a, b) /∈ A∗ \ EA. Since A∗ is completed, s(a, b) ∈ A∗. Hence,
s(a, b) ∈ EA. This makes the Inv-AH-rule applicable. 
The next lemma is an analog of Lemma 4.4.1 for T ∗. Its proof is similar.
Lemma 3.4.2. Let T ∗ be a completed TBox obtained from Σ and CΣ,S by applying the tableau
expansion rules in Figure 3.1. Also, let ET be a set of GCIs which is completed by using
tableau expansion rules in Figure 3.4 starting with the secrecy set ST . Then, the TBox T ∗ \ET
is completed.
We now show that the completed sets EA and ET are in fact envelopes.
Theorem 3.4.1. EA and ET are envelopes for SA and ST respectively .
Proof. We must show that the sets EA and ET satisfy the four properties of Definition 3.4.1.
Properties 1 and 2 are obvious. To prove property 3, suppose A∗ \ EA |= α, for some α ∈ EA.
This means, by Theorem 3.3.2, that α ∈ (A∗ \ EA)∗ and since, by Lemma 3.4.1, A∗ \ EA is
completed, (A∗ \ EA)∗ = A∗ \ EA, whence α ∈ A∗ \ EA. This is a contradiction. Proof of
property 4 is similar, using Theorem 3.3.1 and Lemma 3.4.2 instead of Theorem 3.3.2 and
Lemma 3.4.1, respectively. 
To answer queries as informatively as possible without revealing the secret information, we
should aim to make the size of the envelope E as small as possible. From now on, we focus on
computing a tight envelope E which is defined in Definition 2.5.2. We now show by an example,
that the envelopes computed by using the rules in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are not necessarily tight.
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EvalA(q)
1: case q ∈ A∗ \ EA
2: return “Yes”
3: case q = C uD(a)
4: if EvalA(C(a)) = “Yes” and EvalA(D(a)) = “Yes” then
5: return “Yes”
6: else
7: return “Unknown”
8: case q = ∃r.C(a)
9: if for some d ∈ OΣ [ r(a, d) ∈ A∗ \ EA and EvalA(C(d)) =“Yes”] then
10: return “Yes”
11: else
12: if for some E ∈ CΣ,S [E v C ∈ T ∗ and EvalA(∃r.E(a)) = “Yes” ] then
13: return “Yes”
14: else
15: if for some s ∈ RR [s v r ∈ R∗ and EvalA(∃s.C(a)) = “Yes” ]
then
16: return “Yes”
17: else
18: return “Unknown”
Figure 3.5 Query answering algorithm for assertional queries
Example 3.4.2. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH KB, where A = {C(a), r(b, a)}, T = {A v
B,C v D u E,C v D u F} and R = ∅. Also let SA = {D u E(a), D u F (a)} and ST = {C v
D u E,C v D u F} be the secrecy sets.
Since ΛSA is non-deterministic, we may get different envelopes as an output. Some of the
envelopes are
1 EA = SA ∪ {D(a), F (a)} – not tight,
2 EA = SA ∪ {E(a), F (a)} – tight and
3 EA = SA ∪ {D(a)} – minimum and tight.
Since ΛST is non-deterministic, we may get different envelopes as an output depending on the
choice made in the application of Inv-T+u -rule when computing the envelopes. The envelopes
are
1 ET = ST ∪ {C v D,C v F} – not tight,
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2 ET = ST ∪ {C v E,C v F} – tight and
3 ET = ST ∪ {C v D} – minimum and tight. 
By using the procedure presented in Section 2.5, tight envelopes for the secrecy sets SA and
ST can be computed in polynomial time.
3.5 Query Answering
The recursive procedures given in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 take an input q (as a query) and
output “Yes” or “Unknown”. In Section 3.4, we have described briefly how the reasoner R
responds to queries. In this section we provide a few more details. Here we assume that A∗,
EA, T ∗, ET and R∗ have all been precomputed and are considered to be globally accessible.
Define the set RR = {r | r is a role name that occurs in R}. The recursive procedures for
answering the assertional queries and the GCI queries are given in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6
respectively. In Lines 1 and 2 of Figure 3.5, we check the membership of q in A∗ \ EA and
answer “Yes” if q ∈ A∗ \EA. From line 3 onwards we consider several cases in which we break
the query q into subqueries based on the constructors defined in the language ELH and apply
the procedure recursively.
The following theorem proves the correctness of the algorithm.
Theorem 3.5.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be an ELH KB. Let A∗ be an completed ABox, EA an
envelope of the secrecy set SA and q an assertional query. Then,
- Soundness: EvalA(q) outputs “Yes” ⇒ A∗ \ EA |= q
- Completeness: EvalA(q) outputs “Unknown” ⇒ A∗ \ EA 6|= q
Proof. We first consider the soundness part. Let I be an arbitrary model of Σ and therefore
I satisfies A∗ \ EA, T ∗ and R∗, and let q be a query. We argue inductively by cases:
- q ∈ A∗ \ EA. Since ΛA is sound, we have I |= q.
- q = C uD(a) 6∈ A∗ \ EA. Then, EvalA(C(a)) = EvalA(D(a)) =“Yes” and by inductive
hypothesis, I |= C(a) and I |= D(a). Hence, a ∈ CI∩DI = (CuD)I , i.e., I |= CuD(a).
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- q = ∃r.C(a) /∈ A∗ \ EA. There are several subcases:
- Let for some d ∈ OΣ [ r(a, d) ∈ A∗\EA and EvalA(C(d)) =“Yes”]. Then by the first
case I |= r(a, d) and by inductive hypothesis I |= C(d). This immediately proves
I |= ∃r.C(a).
- Let for some E ∈ CΣ,S [E v C ∈ T ∗ and EvalA(∃r.E(a)) = “Yes”]. Then I |= E v
C, and by inductive hypothesis, I |= ∃r.E(a), whence I |= ∃r.C(a).
- Let for some s ∈ RR [s v r ∈ R∗ and EvalA(∃s.C(a)) = “Yes”]. Then I |= s v r,
and by inductive hypothesis, I |= ∃s.C(a) implying I |= ∃r.C(a).
We prove the completeness part using a contrapositive argument. Assume that A∗ \EA |= q.
We have to show that EvalA(q) = “Yes”. Let K be the canonical interpretation as defined in
section 3.3. By Lemma 3.3.7, K satisfies A∗, T ∗ and R∗ and hence K satisfies A∗ \ EA and
q. We argue that: if K |= q then EvalA(q) = “Yes”, by induction on the structure of q. There
are two cases. If q ∈ A∗ \ EA, then the claim follows immediately. Next, consider the case
q 6∈ A∗ \ EA. There are several cases:
- q = CuD(a). To answer this query the algorithm computes EvalA(C(a)) and EvalA(D(a)).
Now, the assumption K |= CuD(a) implies K |= C(a) and K |= D(a) which, by inductive
hypothesis, implies that EvalA(C(a)) = EvalA(D(a)) = “Yes”. Hence, by Lines 4 and 5
in Figure 3.5, EvalA(C uD(a))=“Yes”.
- q = ∃r.C(a). By the assumption, K |= ∃r.C(a). This implies, for some b ∈ ∆ [(a, b) ∈
rK and b ∈ CK]. There are two subcases:
- r is minimal with respect to (a, b). Again there are two subcases:
- b ∈ OΣ. Then, K |= r(a, b) and K |= C(b). By the first case r(a, b) ∈ A∗ \ EA
and by inductive hypothesis EvalA(C(b)) = “Yes”. Hence, by Lines 9 and 10 in
Figure 3.5, EvalA (∃r.C(a))=“Yes”.
- b = wD ∈ W for some D ∈ CΣ,S. Then, K |= ∃r.D(a) and by part (b) of Lemma
3.3.4, D v C ∈ T ∗. By inductive hypothesis EvalA(∃r.D(a)) = “Yes”. Hence,
by Lines 12 and 13 in Figure 3.5, EvalA(∃r.C(a)) =“Yes”.
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- r is not minimal with respect to (a, b). Since RBox R is acyclic, there exists a chain
s v v1 v v2...... v vk v u in R such that s is minimal with respect to (a, b). Since
R∗ is the transitive closure of R, s v r ∈ R∗. Again there are two cases:
- b ∈ OΣ. Then, by Definition 3.3.2 and the definition of K, K |= s(a, b).
Also, K |= s v r and K |= C(b). By the first subcase of the previous case
EvalA(∃s.C(a)) = “Yes”. Hence, by Lines 15 and 16 in Figure 3.5, EvalA
(∃r.C(a))=“Yes”.
- b = wD ∈ W for some D ∈ CΣ,S. Then, by Definition 3.3.2 and the definition of
K, K |= ∃s.D(a). Also, K |= s v r and by part (b) of Lemma 3.3.4, D v C ∈ T ∗.
By the second subcase of the previous case EvalA(∃s.C(a)) = “Yes”. Hence, by
Lines 15 and 16 in Figure 3.5, EvalA(∃r.C(a)) =“Yes”. 
Since the algorithm given in Figure 3.5 runs in polynomial time in the size of A∗ \EA and q,
the assertional query answering can be done in polynomial time as a function of | A∗ | + | q |.
Next, suppose that the querying agent poses a GCI query q. In response, the reasoner R
invokes the query answering algorithm EvalT(q) given in Figure 3.6 and returns the answer as
output. We prove in the following the correctness of the recursive algorithm given in Figure
3.6.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be an ELH KB. Let T ∗ be an completed TBox, ET an
envelope of the secrecy set ST and q a GCI query. Then,
- Soundness: EvalT(q) outputs “Yes” ⇒ T ∗ \ ET |= q
- Completeness: EvalT(q) outputs “Unknown” ⇒ T ∗ \ ET 6|= q
Proof. We first consider the soundness part. Let I be an arbitrary model of Σ and therefore
I satisfies T ∗ \ ET and R∗, and let q be a GCI query. We argue inductively by cases:
- q ∈ T ∗ \ ET . Since ΛT is sound, we have I |= q.
- q = C v D u E 6∈ T ∗ \ ET . Then, EvalT(C v D) = EvalT(C v E) =“Yes” and by
inductive hypothesis, I |= C v D and I |= C v E. This implies, CI ⊆ DI and CI ⊆ EI .
Hence, CI ⊆ (DI ∩ EI) = (D u E)I , i.e., I |= C v D u E.
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EvalT(q)
1: case q ∈ T ∗ \ ET
2: return “Yes”
3: case q = C v D u E
4: if EvalT(C v D) =“Yes” and EvalT(C v E) =“Yes” then
5: return “Yes”
6: else
7: return “Unknown”
8: case q = C v ∃r.D
9: if for some E ∈ CΣ,S [E v D ∈ T ∗ and EvalT(C v ∃r.E) =“Yes”] then
10: return “Yes”
11: else
12: if for some s ∈ RR [s v r ∈ R∗ and EvalT(C v ∃s.D) =“Yes”] then
13: return “Yes”
14: else
15: return “Unknown”
Figure 3.6 Query answering algorithm for GCI queries
- q = C v ∃r.D /∈ T ∗ \ ET . There are two subcases:
- Let for some E ∈ CΣ,S [ E v D ∈ T ∗ and EvalT(C v ∃r.E) =“Yes”]. Then by
the first case I |= E v D, and by inductive hypothesis, I |= C v ∃r.E, whence
I |= C v ∃r.D.
- Let for some s ∈ RR [s v r ∈ R∗ and EvalT(C v ∃s.D) = “Yes”]. Then I |= s v r,
and by inductive hypothesis, I |= C v ∃s.D implying I |= C v ∃r.D.
We prove the completeness part using a contrapositive argument. Assume that T ∗ \ ET |= q.
We have to show that EvalT(q) =“Yes”. Let J be the canonical interpretation as defined in
section 3.3. By Lemma 3.3.2, J satisfies T ∗ and R∗. Hence J satisfies T ∗ \ ET and q. We
argue by induction on the structure of q that, if J |= q then EvalT(q) = “Yes”. The basic case
is, q ∈ T ∗ \ET . Then, by Lines 1 and 2 in Figure 3.6, the claim is obvious. Next, consider the
case q 6∈ T ∗ \ ET . There are several cases:
- q = C v DuE. The algorithm in Figure 3.6 computes EvalT(C v D) and EvalT(C v E).
Now, the assumption J |= C v D u E implies J |= C v D and J |= C v E which, by
inductive hypothesis, implies that EvalT(C v D) = EvalT(C v E) = “Yes”. Hence, by
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Lines 4 and 5 in Figure 3.6, EvalT(C v D u E) = “Yes”.
- q = C v ∃r.D. By the assumption, J |= C v ∃r.D. This implies, C, D ∈ CΣ,S and
∃r.D 6∈ CΣ,S .
- J |= C v ∃r.E1, E1 v E2, ...Ek−1 v Ek, Ek v D where ∃r.E1, E2, .... Ek ∈ CΣ,S
and C v ∃r.E1, E1 v E2, ...Ek−1 v Ek, Ek v D ∈ T ∗ \ ET . Since, by Lemma 3.4.2,
T ∗ \ET is completed, E1 v D ∈ T ∗ \ET . Also, by the basic step, EvalT(C v ∃r.E1)
= “Yes”. Hence, by Lines 9 and 10, EvalT(C v ∃r.D) = “Yes”.
- J |= C v ∃s.D, s v v1, v1 v v2, .....vk v r where ∃s.D ∈ CΣ,S, s, v1, v2, ...vk ∈ RR,
C v ∃s.D ∈ T ∗ and s v v1, v1 v v2, .....vk v r ∈ R∗. Then, s v r ∈ R∗ and by the
basic step, EvalT(C v ∃s.D) = “Yes”. Hence, by Lines 15 and 16, EvalT(C v ∃r.D)
= “Yes”. 
Since the algorithm runs in polynomial time in the size of T ∗ \ ET and q, the GCI query
answering can be done in polynomial time as a function of | T ∗ | + | q |.
Example 3.5.1. (Example 3.4.1 cont.) Recall that A∗ and T ∗ are the completed ABox and
TBox respectively. Also, recall that EA = SA ∪ {D(a)} and ET = ST ∪ {C v D} are the the
envelopes for SA and ST respectively.
Suppose that the querying agent asks the assertional queries CuE(a), ∃r.C(b), ∃r.E(b) and
D(a). Using the algorithm in Figure 3.5, we get the following answers:
q EvalA(q) Remarks
C u E(a) Yes by Lines 4, 5
∃r.E(b) Yes by Lines 12, 13
D(a) Unknown by Line 18
Next, suppose that the querying agent asks the GCI queries C v C u E, ∃r.C v ∃r.E and
C v D. Using the algorithm in Figure 3.6, we get the following answers:
q EvalT(q) Remarks
C v C u E Yes by Lines 4, 5
∃r.C v ∃r.E Yes by Lines 9, 10
C v D Unknown by Line 15 
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3.6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this chapter is that we allow secrets as well as queries to be of
two types: (a) local type, assertions about specific individuals (e.g., C(a) or r(a, b)), as well as
(b) global type, GCIs (e.g., C v D) which specify hierarchical inclusion relationships between
concepts. Another contribution is in the way that we compute the consequences and preserve
secrecy while answering queries. We break the process into two parts, first one precomputes
all the consequences for concepts and individuals that occur in the given KB. For this we use
four separate (but related) tableau procedures. As for the actual query answering, we parse the
query all the way to constituents that occur in the previously precomputed set of consequences.
Then, the queries are answered based on the membership of the constituents of the query in
A∗ \ EA and T ∗ \ ET . All the algorithms are efficient and can be implemented in polynomial
time.
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CHAPTER 4. KEEPING SECRETS IN MODALIZED DL
KNOWLEDGE BASES
4.1 Introduction
Recently, Tao et al., in Tao et al. (2014) have developed a conceptual framework to study
secrecy-preserving reasoning and query answering in DL knowledge bases (KBs) under Open
World Assumptions (OWA). The approach uses the notion of an envelope to hide secret infor-
mation against logical inference and it was first defined and used in Tao et al. (2010). This
approach is based on the assumption that the information contained in a KB is incomplete
(by OWA) and (so far) it has been restricted to very simple DLs and simple query languages.
Specifically, in Tao et al. (2010, 2014); Krishnasamy Sivaprakasam and Slutzki (2016) the main
idea was to utilize the secret information within the reasoning process, but then answering “Un-
known” whenever the answer is truly unknown or in case the true answer could compromise
confidentiality.
The modalized DLs are DLs with modal operators. Lutz et al., in Lutz et al. (2001)
presented a tableau decision algorithm for modalized ALC. In Tao et al. (2012), the authors
studied satisfiability reasoning problem in acyclic modalized ALC KBs. Also in many reported
research articles regarding privacy, modal logic is used to study privacy related reasoning tasks,
see Barth and Mitchell (2005); Halpern and O’Neill (2005); Jafari et al. (2011). Specifically
in Halpern and O’Neill (2005), the authors showed that the modal logic of knowledge for
multiagent systems provides a fundamental framework for reasoning about anonymity. This
framework was extended in Tsukada et al. (2009) to reasoning about privacy. In an attempt to
reduce the complexity of reasoning in modal logic, Hemaspaandra in Hemaspaandra (2000) had
considered several propositional modal logic languages with one modal operator. Motivated by
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these works, in this chapter we study secrecy-preserving query answering problem for ELH♦
KBs where ELH♦ is the description logic ELH augmented with a modal operator ♦.
Given an ELH♦ KB Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉, a first step in constructing secrecy-preserving reasoning
system, we use a tableau algorithm to compute a finite rooted labeled tree T. The labeling set
of the root node of this T is A∗ which contains a set of consequences of the KB Σ, restricted
to concepts that actually occur in Σ and an extra “auxiliary” set of concepts defined over the
signature of Σ. Since the computed tree does not contain all the consequences of the KB, in
order to answer user queries we have designed a recursive algorithm which breaks the queries
into smaller assertions all the way until the information in T can be used. In effect, we have split
the task of query answering into two parts: in the first part we compute all the consequences of
Σ restricted to concepts and individuals that occur in Σ, in the second part we use a recursive
algorithm to evaluate more complex queries with the base case that has been computed in the
first part.
To protect the secret information in the secrecy set S, we compute an envelope E which
is a function that assigns a set of assertions to each node in T. This envelope is computed
by a another tableau algorithm based on the idea of inverting the local and global expansion
rules given in the first tableau algorithm. The idea behind the envelope concept is that no
expression in the envelope can be logically deduced from information outside the envelope.
Once such envelope is computed, the answers to the queries are censored whenever the queries
belong to the envelope. Since, generally, an envelope for a given secrecy set is not unique, the
developer has some freedom to output a envelope (from the available choices) satisfying the
needs of application domain, company policy, social obligations or user preferences.
Next, we discuss a query answering procedure which allows us to answer queries without
revealing secrets. The queries are answered based on the information available in the secrecy-
preserving tree obtained from the tree T and the envelope E, see Section 4.4. This tree, once
computed, remains fixed. Usually in secrecy-preserving query answering framework queries are
answered by checking their membership in a previously computed set, see Tao et al. (2010,
2014); Krishnasamy Sivaprakasam and Slutzki (2016). Since the secrecy-preserving tree does
not contain all the statements entailed by Σ, we need to extend the query answering procedure
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from just membership checking. Towards that end we designed a recursive algorithm to answer
more complicated queries. To answer a query q, the algorithm first checks if q is a member of
the labeling set of the root node of secrecy-preserving tree, in which case the answer is “Yes”;
otherwise, the given query is broken into subqueries based on the logical constructors, and the
algorithm is applied recursively on the subqueries, see Section 4.5.
4.2 Syntax and Semantics of ELH♦
A vocabulary of ELH♦ is a triple < NO, NC , NR > of countably infinite, pairwise disjoint
sets. The elements of NO are called object (or individual) names, the elements of NC are called
concept names and the elements of NR are called role names. The set of ELH♦ concepts is
denoted by C and is defined by the following rules
C ::= A | > | C uD | ∃r.C | ♦C
where A ∈ NC , r ∈ NR, > denotes the “top concept”, C,D ∈ C and ♦C denotes the modal
constructor, read as “diamond C”. Assertions are expressions of the form C(a) or r(a, b),
general concept inclusions (GCIs) are expressions of the form C v D and role inclusions are
expressions of the form r v s where C,D ∈ C, r, s ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO.
The semantics of ELH♦ concepts is defined by using Kripke structures Blackburn et al.
(2002); Kripke (1963). A Kripke structure is a tuple M = 〈S, pi, E〉 where S is a set of states,
E ⊆ S×S is the accessibility relation, and pi interprets the syntax of ELH♦ at each state s ∈ S.
The intuitive meaning of (s, t) ∈ E is that state t would be considered as a possible state from
the state s in M. Further, we denote by E(s) the set {t | (s, t) ∈ E} of the successors of the
state s.
All the concepts and role names will be interpreted in a common (i.e., state-independent)
non-empty domain which we denote by ∆, see Lutz et al. (2001); Tao et al. (2012). The
interpretation of concepts and role names is defined inductively as follows: for all a ∈ NO,
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A ∈ NC , r ∈ NR, C,D ∈ C and for all s ∈ S,
>pi(s) = ∆; api(s) ∈ ∆;
Api(s) ⊆ ∆; rpi(s) ⊆ ∆×∆;
(C uD)pi(s) = Cpi(s) ∩Dpi(s);
(♦C)pi(s) =
⋃
t∈E(s)C
pi(t);
(∃r.C)pi(s) = {d ∈ ∆ | ∃e ∈ Cpi(s) : (d, e) ∈ rpi(s)}.
An ABox A is a finite, non-empty set of assertions, a TBox T is a finite set of GCIs and
an RBox R is a finite set of role inclusions. An ELH♦ KB is a triple Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 where A
is an ABox, T is a TBox and R is an RBox.
Let M = 〈S, pi, E〉 be a Kripke structure, s ∈ S, C,D ∈ C, r, t ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO. We say
that (M, s) satisfies C(a), r(a, b), C v D or r v t, notation (M, s) |= C(a), (M, s) |= r(a, b),
(M, s) |= C v D or (M, s) |= r v t if, respectively, api(s) ∈ Cpi(s), (api(s), bpi(s)) ∈ rpi(s),
Cpi(s) ⊆ Dpi(s) or rpi(s) ⊆ tpi(s). (M, s) satisfies Σ, notation (M, s) |= Σ, if (M, s) satisfies all
the assertions in A, all the GCIs in T and all the role inclusions in R. M satisfies Σ, or M is
a model of Σ, if there exists a s ∈ S such that (M, s) |= Σ and for all t ∈ S, (M, t) |= T ∪ R.
Let α be an assertion, a GCI or a role inclusion. We say that Σ entails α, notation Σ |= α, if
for all Kripke structures M satisfying Σ and for all states s of M, (M, s) |= Σ ⇒ (M, s) |= α.
4.3 Computation of a Model for ELH♦ KB Σ and A∗
Before presenting an algorithm to compute a model for the given KB, we describe a pre-
processing procedure to eliminate occurrences of > from the KB. In the first step we apply the
following rules exhaustively to Σ3 = 〈A3, T3,R〉 until no further applications are possible to
get a new KB Σ2 = 〈A2, T2,R〉. We initialize A2 as A3 and T2 as T3.
- If > v C ∈ T2, then remove it from T2 and replace C by > throughout Σ2;
- If ♦> occurs in Σ2, then replace ♦> by > throughout Σ2 and
- If C u > or > u C occurs in Σ2, then replace it by C throughout Σ2.
62
Let O′ be the set of individual names occurring in Σ2. In the second step we apply the
following rules exhaustively to Σ2 until no further application is possible. Let Σ1 = 〈A1, T1,R〉
be the KB obtained from Σ2. In this step, we initialize A1 as A2 and T1 as T2.
- If >(a) ∈ A1, then remove >(a) from A1;
- If ∃r.>(a) ∈ A1 and ∀ d ∈ O′, r(a, d) 6∈ A1, then add r(a, b) to A1 where b is a fresh
individual name and O′ = O′ ∪ {b}; Remove ∃r.>(a) from A1;
- If C v ∃r.> ∈ T1, C(a) ∈ A1 and ∀ d ∈ O′, r(a, d) 6∈ A1, then add r(a, b) to A1 where b
is a fresh individual name and O′ = O′ ∪ {b};
- If C v > ∈ T1, then remove C v > from T1, and
- If ∃r.> v C ∈ T1 and r(a, b) ∈ A1 and C(a) 6∈ A1, then add C(a) to A1.
Finally, as a last step, we remove all the subsumptions of the form C v ∃r.> and ∃r.> v C
from Σ1. Here C, D ∈ C, r ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be the output of this
diminution procedure. It is easy to see that Σ can be computed using the rules from Σ3 in the
polynomial time in | Σ3 |. From the rules, it is easy to see that Σ3 |= α if and only if Σ |= α
where α is an assertion, a GCI or a role inclusion. Hereafter in this chapter, we assume that
all KBs are free from > symbol.
Denote by NΣ the set of all concept names and role names occurring in Σ and let S be
a finite set of concepts over the symbol set NΣ
1. Let CΣ,S be the set of all subconcepts of
concepts that occur in S or Σ and define
A∗ = {C(a) | C ∈ CΣ,S and Σ |= C(a)} ∪ {r(a, b) | Σ |= r(a, b)}.
We use OΣ to denote the set of individual names that occur in Σ, and define the witness set
W = {w rC | r is a role name that occurs in Σ and C ∈ CΣ,S}. Define O∗ = OΣ ∪W. Given Σ
and CΣ,S , we outline a procedure that computes a tree called a constraint tree over Σ, see Lutz
et al. (2001); Horrocks et al. (2006); Tao et al. (2012) for similar constructions. A constraint
tree over Σ is a rooted tree T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 where V is a set of nodes, k0 ∈ V is the root
1A technicality; S will be used in Section 4.4 in the context of secrecy-preserving reasoning.
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u+ − rule : if C(a), D(a) ∈ L(i), C uD ∈ CΣ,S , and
C uD(a) /∈ L(i), then L(i) := L(i) ∪ {C uD(a)};
u− − rule : if C uD(a) ∈ L(i), and C(a) /∈ L(i) or D(a) /∈ L(i),
then L(i) := L(i) ∪ {C(a), D(a)};
∃+ − rule : if r(a, b), C(b) ∈ L(i), ∃r.C ∈ CΣ,S and
∃r.C(a) /∈ L(i), then L(i) := L(i) ∪ {∃r.C(a)};
∃− − rule : if ∃r.C(a) ∈ L(i), and ∀b ∈ O∗, {r(a, b), C(b)} 6⊆ L(i),
then L(i) := L(i) ∪ {r(a,w rC ), C(w rC )}, where w rC ∈ W;
v −rule : if C(a) ∈ L(i), C v D ∈ T , and D(a) /∈ L(i),
then L(i) := L(i) ∪ {D(a)};
H − rule : if r(a, b) ∈ L(i), r v s ∈ R, and s(a, b) /∈ L(i),
then L(i) := L(i) ∪ {s(a, b)};
Figure 4.1 Local expansion rules
node of T, E is a set of directed edges and L is a function that labels each node with a set of
assertions which are obtained by applying the expansion rules specified below. The procedure
builds T starting from the root node k0 whose labeling set L(k0) is initialized as the ABox A.
Further, T is grown by recursively applying the expansion rules in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. T is
said to be completed if no expansion rule in Figures 4.1 or 4.2 is applicable to it. The procedure
is designed to output a completed constraint tree T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 with L(k0) = A∗. For the
purpose of query answering, T is used as a “good approximation” of a (Kripke) model of the
given KB, see Section 4.5.
In more detail, there are two kinds of expansion rules: (a) local expansion rules and (b)
global expansion rules. Local expansion rules are given in Figure 4.1 and generate new assertions
within a single labeling set. The u−-rule decomposes conjunctions, and ∃−-rule decomposes
existential restriction assertions of the form ∃r.C(a) by introducing a corresponding witness
w rC from the set W. The v-rule derives new assertions based on the GCIs present in T . To
construct concept assertions whose associated concept expressions already belong to CΣ,S , we
use the u+ and ∃+-rules. Finally, the H-rule derives role assertions based on role inclusions
in R. The global expansion rules are given in Figure 4.2. The ♦−-rule generates new nodes
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♦− − rule : if there is a node i with ♦C(a) ∈ L(i) and
i has no successor j with C(a) ∈ L(j),
then add a new successor k of i with L(k) := {C(a)};
♦+ − rule : if there is a node i with C(a) ∈ L(i), ♦C ∈ CΣ,S
and i has a parent j with ♦C(a) 6∈ L(j),
then L(j) := L(j) ∪ {♦C(a)}.
Figure 4.2 Global expansion rules
k0
k1 k2
k3 k4
L(k0) = A∗ = {♦A(a), B(a), C(d),∃u.C(a),
♦♦(D u E)(d), u(a, d), v(a, d),♦♦D(d)}
L(k1) = {A(a)} L(k2) = {♦(D u E)(d),♦D(d),
♦G(d)}
L(k3) = {D u E(d), D(d),
E(d),∃u.F (d), F (wuF ),
u(d,wuF ), v(d,w
u
F )}
L(k4) = {G(d)}
Figure 4.3 Completed constraint tree T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉
.
that are directly accessible from the current node. The ♦+-rule adds a new ♦ assertion to the
parent node from its current child node.
Example 4.3.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH♦ KB, where A = {♦A(a), C(d), u(a, d)}, T =
{♦A v B,C v ♦♦(D u E), E v ∃u.F,♦D v ♦G}, R = {u v v} and S = {∃u.C, ♦♦D}.
Then, applying the rules in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 we compute the completed constraint tree
T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 whose labeling sets are given in Figure 4.3. 
We will use the following notion of TBox acyclicity, called here ♦-acyclicity.
Definition 4.3.1. A sequence S0, S1...., Sn, ... of concept assertions over Σ, is called a ♦-
sequence, if it satisfies the following conditions:
• S0 = C0(a0), C0 ∈ CΣ,S, a0 ∈ O∗.
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• Given, Sn = Cn(an), with Cn ∈ CΣ,S, an ∈ O∗, the next element in the sequence can be
obtained as follows: Let Bn be the set of all assertions obtained by applying the local rules
starting from Sn. Put Dn = Bn ∪ {Sn}.
- If Dn does not contain any ♦-assertions, then Sn is the last assertion of the sequence.
- If Dn contains some ♦-assertions, then pick one, say ♦P (b), and define Sn+1 =
Cn+1(an+1) = P (b).
The resulting ♦-sequence is said to be non-repetitive, if for distinct i, j, Ci 6= Cj.
Definition 4.3.2. A TBox T is said to be ♦-acyclic (with respect to the rules given in Figures
4.1 and 4.2), if every ♦-sequence is non-repetitive.
In this chapter, we assume that all TBoxes are ♦-acyclic as per Definition 4.3.2 (we shall
omit the phrase “with respect to the rules”). We denote by Λ the algorithm which, given
Σ and CΣ,S , nondeterministically applies the expansion rules in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 until no
further applications are possible. It is easy to see that for each node k in the constraint tree
T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉, the size of L(k) is polynomial in | Σ | + | CΣ,S |. An upper bound for the
depth of T is given in the following claim which follows immediately from Definitions 4.3.1 and
4.3.2.
Claim 1. The depth of T is O(| CΣ,S |).
All executions of Λ terminate and by Claim 1, Λ builds a tree T whose depth is linear
in | CΣ,S |. Since the ♦-rule can in some cases be applied exponentially many times in |
Σ | + | CΣ,S |, T may have exponentially many nodes. For instance, consider a ELH♦ KB
Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉, where A = {A1(a)}, T = {Ai v ♦∃r.Ai+1, Ai v ♦∃s.Ai+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1} and
R = ∅. Clearly, TBox T is ♦-acyclic. To compute the constraint tree T for Σ, the global rules
must be applied exponentially many times, implying that, the worst case the running time of
Λ is exponential in | Σ | + | CΣ,S |.
Before proving the correctness of Λ, we define the notion of interpretation of a constraint
tree, see Lutz et al. (2001); Tao et al. (2012).
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Definition 4.3.3. Let T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 be a constraint tree over Σ, M = 〈S, pi, E〉 a Kripke
structure, and σ a mapping from V to S. We say that M satisfies T via σ if for all k, k′ ∈ V,
- (k, k′) ∈ E⇒ (σ(k), σ(k′)) ∈ E, and
- (M, σ(k)) |= L(k), i.e., (M, σ(k)) |= α for every α ∈ L(k)
We say that M satisfies T, denoted as M ||= T, if there is a mapping σ such that M satisfies T
via σ.
In the next lemma, we formulate the local soundness property of Λ. We say that f ′ is an
extension of a function f if f ′ agrees with f on the domain of f .
Lemma 4.3.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be ELH♦ KB with an ♦-acyclic TBox T and let M =
〈S, pi, E〉 be a Kripke structure satisfying Σ. Also let T be a constraint tree over Σ, α a local
or global expansion rule and Tα a constraint tree obtained by applying α to T. If M satisfies T
via σ, then there exists a Kripke structure M′ = 〈S, pi′, E〉 such that
- pi′ is an extension of pi,
- M′ satisfies Tα via σ′, where σ′ is an extension of σ, and
- M′ satisfies Σ.
Proof. (Outline). We present two cases to illustrate how M is transformed into M′ by the
applications of local and global extension rules; for more details see Tao et al. (2012). Assume
the hypotheses and let α be the ∃−-rule. Then, for some k ∈ V, ∃r.C(a) ∈ L(k) in T, and since
M satisfies T via σ, we have (M, σ(k)) |= ∃r.C(a). By the semantics of existential restriction,
there exists a d ∈ ∆ such that (api(σ(k)), d) ∈ rpi(σ(k)) and d ∈ Cpi(σ(k)). After applying the
∃−-rule, L(k) := L(k) ∪ {r(a,w rC ), C(w rC )}. We have two cases: (1) If w rC occurs in T before
the application of the ∃−-rule to ∃r.C(a), then M′ = M; (2) If w rC does not occur in T before
the application of the ∃−-rule to ∃r.C(a), then define the interpretation pi′ as pi except for w rC :
(w rC )
pi′(σ(k)) = d. The resulting constraint tree Tα is satisfied by M′ = 〈S, pi′, E〉 via σ. Since
M satisfies Σ and pi′ is an extension of pi, we conclude that M′ satisfies Σ.
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Now let α be the ♦−-rule. Then, for some k ∈ V, ♦C(a) ∈ L(k) in T and k does not have
a successor l with C(a) ∈ L(l). Since M satisfies T via σ, we have (M, σ(k)) |= ♦C(a). By
the semantics of ♦, there exists a state s ∈ S such that (σ(k), s) ∈ E and api(s) ∈ Cpi(s). After
applying the ♦−-rule, L(k′) := L(k′) ∪ {C(a)} where k′ is a newly generated node, and (k, k′)
is the new edge. Now we extend σ to σ′ by setting σ′(k′) = s. The resulting constraint tree is
Tα = 〈Vα, k0,Eα,L〉 where Vα = V∪{k′} and Eα = E∪{(k, k′)}. It follows that, Tα is satisfied
by M′ via σ′ where M′ = M. Clearly, M′ satisfies Σ. 
Lemma 4.3.1 makes sure that each application of local and global rules preserves the model
existence property. Next we define the canonical Kripke structure of a constraint tree.
Definition 4.3.4. Let T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 be a completed constraint tree over Σ. The canonical
Kripke structure MT = 〈S, pi, E〉 for T is defined as follows:
- S = V,
- E = E ,
- ∆ = O∗ = OΣ ∪W,
- api(k) = a for all a ∈ O∗ and each k ∈ V,
- Api(k) = {a ∈ O∗ | A(a) ∈ L(k)}, for all A ∈ NC ∩NΣ,
- rpi(k) = {(a, b) ∈ O∗ ×O∗ | r(a, b) ∈ L(k)}, for all r ∈ NR ∩NΣ,
pi(k) is extended to compound concepts in the usual way (see Section 4.2).
The following lemma shows that MT satisfies the completed constraint tree T.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be ELH♦ KB with a ♦-acyclic TBox T . Also let T be a
completed constraint tree over Σ. Then MT ||= T.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses. To show that MT ||= T, let σ be the identity function. By
Definition 4.3.4, for each k, k′ ∈ V, (k, k′) ∈ E⇒ (k, k′) ∈ E. Now assume that r(a, b) ∈ L(k)
where r ∈ NR, a, b ∈ O∗ and k ∈ V. Again by Definition 4.3.4, (a, b) ∈ rpi(k) implying
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(MT, k) |= r(a, b). To show that C(a) ∈ L(k) implies (MT, k) |= C(a), we argue by induction
on structure of C. When C ∈ NC , the claim follows directly from Definition 4.3.4. Let k ∈ V
and a ∈ O∗. The case C = D u E is easy and omitted.
- ∃r.D(a) ∈ L(k). There are two cases:
- k = k0. We have two subcases:
- For some b ∈ OΣ, r(a, b), D(b) ∈ L(k). By Definition 4.3.4, (MT, k) |= r(a, b)
and by the induction hypothesis (MT, k) |= D(b) implying (MT, k) |= ∃r.D(a) =
C(a).
- For every b ∈ OΣ, {r(a, b), D(b)} 6⊆ L(k). Since T is completed, by the ∃−-rule,
r(a,w rD ), D(w
r
D ) ∈ L(k). By Definition 4.3.4, (MT, k) |= r(a,w rD ) and by the
induction hypothesis (MT, k) |= D(w rD ) implying (MT, k) |= ∃r.D(a) = C(a).
- k 6= k0. Since T is completed, by the ∃−-rule, r(a,w rD ), D(w rD ) ∈ L(k). By Defini-
tion 4.3.4, (MT, k) |= r(a,w rD ) and by the induction hypothesis (MT, k) |= D(w rD )
implying (MT, k) |= ∃r.D(a) = C(a).
- ♦D(a) ∈ L(k). Since T is completed, by the ♦−-rule, there exists k′ ∈ V such that
(k, k′) ∈ E and D(a) ∈ L(k′). By Definition 4.3.4, (k, k′) ∈ E and by the induction
hypothesis (MT, k′) |= D(a). Hence (MT, k) |= ♦D(a) = C(a). 
Next we prove that (MT, k) |= T ∪ R, for each k ∈ S. We need the following auxiliary
lemma.
Lemma 4.3.3. For each C ∈ CΣ,S , each a ∈ O∗ and each k ∈ V, if (MT, k) |= C(a) then
C(a) ∈ L(k).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of C. When C ∈ NC , the claim follows
directly from Definition 4.3.4. The case C = D u E is easy and omitted.
- C = ∃r.D. By assumption, (MT, k) |= ∃r.D(a). This implies, (MT, k) |= r(a, b) and
(MT, k) |= D(b) for some b ∈ O∗. By Definition 4.3.4, r(a, b) ∈ L(k) and by induction
hypothesis D(b) ∈ L(k). Since T is completed and ∃r.D ∈ CΣ,S , by the ∃+-rule, ∃r.D(a) =
C(a) ∈ L(k).
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- C = ♦D. By assumption, (MT, k) |= ♦D(a). Hence, for some k′ ∈ E(k), (MT, k′) |=
D(a). By Definition 4.3.4, (k, k′) ∈ E and by the induction hypothesis D(a) ∈ L(k′).
Since T is completed and ♦D ∈ CΣ,S , by the ♦+-rule, ♦D(a) = C(a) ∈ L(k). 
Lemma 4.3.4. For each k ∈ S, (MT, k) |= T ∪ R.
Proof. First we show that (MT, k) |= T , for each k ∈ S. Suppose that C v D ∈ T and let
a ∈ Cpi(k). This means that (MT, k) |= C(a) and by Lemma 4.3.3, C(a) ∈ L(k). Since T is
completed, by the v-rule, D(a) ∈ L(k). Since MT ||= T, by Lemma 4.3.2, (MT, k) |= D(a).
Therefore, (MT, k) |= C v D. Hence, (MT, k) |= T .
Next, we show that (MT, k) |= R, for each k ∈ S. Let r v s ∈ R and assume that
(MT, k) |= r(a, b) . By Definition 4.3.4, r(a, b) ∈ L(k). Since T is completed, by the H-rule,
s(a, b) ∈ L(k). Since MT ||= T, by Lemma 4.3.2, (MT, k) |= s(a, b). Therefore, (MT, k) |= r v s.
Hence (MT, k) |= R. 
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.
Corollary 4.3.1. MT satisfies Σ.
Proof. By Definitions 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 and Lemmas 4.3.2 and 4.3.4, we have that (1) (MT, k0) |=
Σ and (2) for each k ∈ V, (MT, k) |= T ∪ R. Hence MT satisfies Σ. 
The proof of the next theorem follows immediately from Definition 4.3.4 and Lemma 4.3.3.
In a sense, this theorem captures the completeness property of the algorithm Λ.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 be a completed constraint tree over Σ and MT = 〈S, pi, E〉
a canonical Kripke structure for T. Then, for all k ∈ V, C ∈ CΣ,S , r ∈ NΣ ∩ NR, and all
a, b ∈ O∗
- (MT, k) |= r(a, b)⇒ r(a, b) ∈ L(k) and
- (MT, k) |= C(a)⇒ C(a) ∈ L(k).
Finally, the following is a consequence of Theorem 4.3.1 and Corollary 4.3.1.
Corollary 4.3.2. L(k0) = A∗.
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4.4 Secrecy-Preserving Reasoning in ELH♦ KBs
Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH♦ KB and S ⊆ A∗ the “secrecy set”. Also let T = 〈V, k0,E, L〉
be a completed constraint tree over Σ. Given Σ, S and T, the objective is to answer assertion
queries while preserving secrecy, i.e., answering queries so that assertions in S remain protected.
Our approach is to compute a function E that assigns a finite set of assertions to each node in
T. E is called the secrecy Envelope for S, so that protecting E(i) for all i ∈ V, the querying
agent cannot logically infer any assertion in S. The sets E(i) for each i ∈ V are obtained
by applying the inverted expansion rules given in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The role of OWA in
answering the queries is the following: When answering a query with “Unknown”, the querying
agent should not be able to distinguish between the case that the answer to the query is truly
unknown to the KB reasoner and the case that the answer is being protected for reasons of
secrecy. We envision a situation in which once the T is computed, a reasoner R is associated
with it, i.e., R has unfettered access to T. R is designed to answer queries as follows: If a
query cannot be inferred from Σ, the answer is “Unknown”. If it can be inferred and it is not
in E(k0), the answer is “Yes”; otherwise, the answer is “Unknown”. We make the following
assumptions about the capabilities of the querying agent:
(a) does not have direct access to ABox A, but is aware of the underlying vocabulary of Σ,
(b) has full access to TBox T and RBox R,
(c) can ask queries in the form of assertions, and
(d) is not aware of the witness set W, by hidden name assumptions (HNA), for more details
see Tao et al. (2010).
We formally define the notion of an envelope in the following:
Definition 4.4.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH♦ KB, S a finite secrecy set and T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉
a completed constraint tree. The secrecy envelope of S is a function E with domain V satisfying
the following properties:
- S ⊆ E(k0),
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Inv- u− −rule : if {C(a), D(a)} ∩ E(i) 6= ∅ and C uD(a) ∈ L(i) \ E(i),
then E(i) := E(i) ∪ {C uD(a)};
Inv- u+ −rule : if C uD(a) ∈ E(i), {C(a), D(a)} ⊆ L(i) \ E(i) and
C uD ∈ CΣ,S , then E(i) := E(i) ∪ {C(a)} or E(i) := E(i) ∪ {D(a)};
Inv-∃+ − rule : if ∃r.C(a) ∈ E(i), {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ L(i) \ E(i) with b ∈ O∗ and
∃r.C ∈ CΣ,S , then E(i) := E(i) ∪ {r(a, b)} or E(i) := E(i) ∪ {C(b)};
Inv- v −rule : if D(a) ∈ E(i), C v D ∈ T , and C(a) ∈ L(i) \ E(i),
then E(i) := E(i) ∪ {C(a)};
Inv-H − rule : if s(a, b) ∈ E(i), r v s ∈ R, and r(a, b) ∈ L(i) \ E(i),
then E(i) := E(i) ∪ {r(a, b)}.
Figure 4.4 Inverted local expansion rules
- for each i ∈ V, E(i) ⊆ L(i), and
- for each i ∈ V, each α ∈ E(i), L(i) \ E(i) 6|= α.
The intuition for the above definition is that no information in E(i) can be inferred from
the set L(i) \ E(i) for each i ∈ V. To compute an envelope, we use the idea of inverting
the rules of Figures 1 and 2 (see Tao et al. (2010), where this approach was first utilized for
membership assertions). Induced by the Local and Global expansion rules in Figures 4.1 and
4.2, we define the corresponding “inverted” Local and Global expansion rules in Figures 4.4
and 4.5, respectively. Note that the ∃−-rule does not have its corresponding inverted rule.
The reason for the omission is that an application of this rule results in adding assertions with
individual names from the witness set. By HNA, the querying agent is barred from asking
any queries that involve individual names from the witness set. Inverted expansion rules are
denoted by prefixing Inv- to the name of the corresponding expansion rules.
From now on, we assume that T has been computed and is readily available for computing
the envelope. The computation begins with the initialization step: The set E(k0) is initialized
as S, and E(i) is initialized as ∅ for all i ∈ V \ {k0}. Next, the sets E(k0) and E(i) for all
i ∈ V\{k0} are expanded using the inverted expansion rules listed in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 until no
further applications are possible. The resulting function E is said to be completed. We denote
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Inv-♦− − rule : if there is a node j with C(a) ∈ E(j) and ♦C(a) ∈ L(i) \ E(i)
where i is the parent of j, then E(i) := E(i) ∪ {♦C(a)};
Inv-♦+ − rule : if there is a node i with ♦C(a) ∈ E(i) and C(a) ∈ L(j) \ E(j)
where j is a successor of i and ♦C ∈ CΣ,S ,
then E(j) := E(j) ∪ {C(a)}.
Figure 4.5 Inverted global expansion rule
by ΛS the algorithm which computes the sets E(i) for all i ∈ V. Due to non-determinism in
applying the rules Inv-u+ and Inv-∃+, different executions of ΛS may result different outputs.
Since for each i ∈ V, L(i) is finite, the computation of ΛS terminates. Let the sets E(i) for
i ∈ V be an output of ΛS. Since the size of each L(i) is polynomial in |Σ| + |CΣ,S |, and each
application of inverted expansion rule moves an assertion from L(i) into E(i), the size of E(i)
is at most the size of L(i). Since the size of V can be exponential, ΛS may take exponential
time to compute the sets E(i). Define the secrecy-preserving tree (constraint) for the secrecy
set S to be TE = 〈V, k0,E, LE〉, where LE(i) = L(i) \ E(i) for all i ∈ V.
Example 4.4.1. (Example 4.3.1 cont.) Recall that T = 〈V, k0,E,L〉 is the completed constraint
tree. Let S = {B(a),♦♦D(d)} be the secrecy set. Then, by using rules in Figures 4.4 and 4.5
we compute the envelope for S, and one of the corresponding secrecy-preserving trees is given
in Figure 4.6:
- E(k0) = S ∪ {♦A(a), C(d),♦♦(D u E)(d)},
- E(k1) = {A(a)},
- E(k2) = {♦(D u E)(d),♦D(d)},
- E(k3) = {D u E(d), D(d)} and
- E(k4) = ∅. 
We use this secrecy-preserving tree for proving some properties of the envelopes and for
answering queries. Before proving the main result on envelopes, we prove several auxiliary
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k0
k1 k2
k3 k4
LE(k0) = {u(a, d),∃u.C(a),
v(a, d)}
LE(k1) = ∅ LE(k2) = {♦G(d)}
LE(k3) = {E(d),
∃u.F (d), u(d,wuF ),
F (wuF ), v(d,w
u
F )}
LE(k4) = {G(d)}
Figure 4.6 Secrecy-preserving tree TE = 〈V, k0,E,LE〉
lemmas. First, we show that for each i ∈ V, no assertions in E(i) is “logically reachable” from
the members of the set LE(i).
Lemma 4.4.1. Let the function E be completed by applying the inverted rules in Figures 4.4
and 4.5. Also, let TE = 〈V, k0,E, LE〉 be a secrecy-preserving tree. Then, for each i ∈ V, LE(i)
is completed.
Proof. Let i be any node in V and j ∈ V its successor. We have to show that no rule in Figures
4.1 or 4.2 is applicable to LE(i) = L(i)\E(i). The proof is by contradiction according to cases:
assuming that a rule in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is applicable and showing that some inverse rule is
applicable.
- If u−-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C u D(a) ∈ LE(i) such that C(a) /∈
LE(i) or D(a) /∈ LE(i). Since L(i) is completed, {C(a), D(a)} ⊆ L(i). Hence, {C(a), D(a)}∩
E(i) 6= ∅. This makes the Inv-u−-rule applicable.
- If u+-rule is applicable, then there are assertions C(a), D(a) ∈ LE(i) such that C u
D ∈ CΣ,S and C u D(a) /∈ LE(i). Since L(i) is completed, C u D(a) ∈ L(i). Hence,
C uD(a) ∈ E(i). This makes the Inv-u+-rule applicable.
- If ∃+-rule is applicable, then there are assertions r(a, b), C(b) ∈ LE(i) such that ∃r.C ∈
CΣ,S and ∃r.C(a) /∈ LE(i). Since L(i) is completed, ∃r.C(a) ∈ L(i). Hence, ∃r.C(a) ∈
E(i). This makes the Inv-∃+-rule applicable.
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- If v-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C(a) ∈ LE(i) and a GCI C v D ∈ T
such that D(a) /∈ LE(i). Since L(i) is completed, D(a) ∈ L(i). Hence, D(a) ∈ E(i). This
makes the Inv-v-rule applicable.
- If H-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion r(a, b) ∈ LE(i) and a role inclusion
r v s ∈ R such that s(a, b) /∈ LE(i). Since L(i) is completed, s(a, b) ∈ L(i). Hence,
s(a, b) ∈ E(i). This makes the Inv-H-rule applicable.
- If ♦+-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C(a) ∈ LE(j) such that ♦C(a) /∈ LE(i)
where i is the predecessor of j. Since L(i) is completed, ♦C(a) ∈ L(i). Hence, ♦C(a) ∈
E(i). This makes the Inv-♦−-rule applicable.
- If ♦−-rule is applicable, then there is an assertion ♦C(a) ∈ LE(i) such that i has no
successor k with C(a) /∈ LE(k). Since T is a completed constraint tree, there is a node
j which is a successor of i such that C(a) ∈ L(j). Hence, C(a) ∈ E(j). This makes the
Inv-♦+-rule applicable. 
Next we claim that the secrecy-preserving tree has similar properties as that of its completed
constraint tree. The proof is similar to the proofs of the Lemmas 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.
Lemma 4.4.2. Let TE = 〈V, k0,E, LE〉 be a secrecy-preserving tree obtained from the completed
constraint tree T = 〈V, k0,E, L〉 over Σ and the completed function E. Define the canonical
Kripke structure MET = 〈S, pi, E〉 for TE as
- S = V,
- E = E ,
- ∆ = O∗ = OΣ ∪W,
- api(k) = a for all a ∈ O∗ and each k ∈ V,
- Api(k) = {a ∈ O∗ | A(a) ∈ LE(k)}, for all A ∈ NC ,
- rpi(k) = {(a, b) ∈ O∗ ×O∗ | r(a, b) ∈ LE(k)}, for all r ∈ NR,
pi(k) is extended to compound concepts in the usual way (see Section 4.2). Then,
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- MET ||= TE,
- For each C ∈ CΣ,S , each a ∈ O∗ and each k ∈ V, if (MET , k) |= C(a), then C(a) ∈ LE(k)
and
- For each k ∈ S, (MET , k) |= T ∪ R.
Finally, we show that a completed function E is in fact an envelope for the secrecy set S,
see Definition 4.4.1.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let T = 〈V, k0,E, L〉 be a completed constraint tree over Σ. Also, let TE =
〈V, k0,E, LE〉 be a secrecy-preserving tree for the secrecy set S. Then, the completed function
E is an envelope for S.
Proof. We have to show that the completed function E satisfies all three properties of Definition
4.4.1. Properties 1 and 2 are obvious. To prove property 3, suppose that for some i ∈ V, some
α ∈ E(i), LE(i) |= α.
Let MET = 〈S, pi, E〉 be the canonical Kripke structure for TE. By Lemma 4.4.2, for each
i ∈ V, (MET , i) |= LE(i). Again, by Lemma 4.4.2, α ∈ LE(i). This is a contradiction.
4.5 Query Answering
Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be a ELH♦ KB. We assume that the secrecy-preserving tree TE =
〈V, k0,E, LE〉 has been precomputed and use E(k) to denote the set {k′ ∈ V | (k, k′) ∈ E} of
the successors of the node k ∈ V. The reasoner R answers queries based on the information
in TE and replies to a query q with “Yes” if Σ |= q and q 6∈ E(k0); otherwise, the answer is
“Unknown”. Because of the syntactic restrictions of the language ELH♦, R does not answer
“No” to any query.
Since the completed constraint tree T over Σ does not contain all the consequences of Σ,
the completed secrecy-preserving tree TE obtained from T does not contain all the information
needed to answer queries. To address this problems we provide a procedure Eval(k, q) which
works by recursively decomposing the compound queries all the way to the information available
in TE . Initial call of this procedure is at the root node k0 of TE . In lines 1 and 2 of Figure
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Eval(k, q)
1: case q ∈ LE(k) = L(k) \ E(k)
2: return “Yes”
3: case q = C uD(a)
4: if Eval(k,C(a)) =“Yes” and Eval(k,D(a)) =“Yes” then
5: return “Yes”
6: else
7: return “Unknown”
8: case q = ∃r.C(a)
9: if for some d ∈ O∗ [ r(a, d) ∈ LE(k) and
Eval(k,C(d)) =“Yes”] then
10: return “Yes”
11: else
12: return “Unknown”
13: case q = ♦C(a)
14: if for some l ∈ E(k) [Eval(l, C(a)) = “Yes” ] then
15: return “Yes”
16: else
17: return “Unknown”
Figure 4.7 Query answering algorithm for assertional queries
4.7, the reasoner checks the membership of q in LE(k) and answers “Yes” if q ∈ LE(k). From
line 3 onwards we consider cases in which query q is broken into subqueries based on the
constructors defined in ELH♦ and apply the procedure recursively. The following theorem
states the correctness claim of the algorithm.
Theorem 4.5.1. Let Σ = 〈A, T ,R〉 be an ELH♦ KB, TE = 〈V, k0,E,LE〉 a completed secrecy-
preserving tree and q a query. Then, for every k ∈ V,
- Soundness: Eval(k, q) outputs “Yes” ⇒ LE(k) |= q;
- Completeness: Eval(k, q) outputs “Unknown” ⇒ LE(k) 6|= q.
Proof. We first consider the soundness part. Assume that Eval(k, q) = “Yes”. Let M =
〈S, pi, E〉 be a Kripke structure satisfying LE(k). Since TE is a completed constraint tree, by
Lemma 4.3.1, M ||= TE, i.e., M satisfies TE via some mapping σ : V→ S. By Definition 4.3.3,
(M, σ(k)) |= LE(k). Now, we prove the claim by induction on the structure of q. The inductive
hypothesis is, for each k ∈ V and each assertion α, if Eval(k, α) = “Yes”, then (M, σ(k)) |= α.
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The base case: If q ∈ LE(k), then by Definition 4.3.3, (M, σ(k)) |= q. Next, consider the case
q 6∈ LE(k).
- q = C uD(a). Then, Eval(k,C(a)) = Eval(k,D(a)) = “Yes” (by Lines 3 and 5 in Figure
4.7) and by inductive hypothesis, (M, σ(k)) |= C(a) and (M, σ(k)) |= D(a). Hence, (M,
σ(k)) |= C uD(a).
- q = ∃r.C(a). Then, for some d ∈ O∗, r(a, d) ∈ LE(k) and Eval(k, C(d)) = “Yes”
(by Lines 8 and 9 in Figure 4.7). By Definition 4.3.3, (M, σ(k)) |= r(a, d) and by the
inductive hypothesis (M, σ(k)) |= C(d). Hence, (M, σ(k)) |= ∃r.C(a).
- q = ♦C(a). Then, for some l ∈ E(k), Eval(l, C(a)) = “Yes” (by Lines 13 and 14
in Figure 4.7). By Definition 4.3.3, (σ(k), σ(l)) ∈ E and by the inductive hypothesis
(M, σ(l)) |= C(a). By the semantics of ♦, (M, σ(k)) |= ♦C(a).
To prove the completeness part assume that LE(k) |= q. We have to show that Eval(k, q) =
“Yes”. Let MET be the canonical Kripke structure for TE as defined in Section 4.4. By Lamma
4.4.2, MET ||= TE and for all k ∈ V, (MET , k) |= T ∪R. Therefore (MET , k) |= LE(k) and hence,
by the assumption, for every k, (MET , k) |= q. We prove the claim by induction on the structure
of q. The inductive hypothesis is, for each k ∈ V and each assertion α if (MET , k) |= α, then
Eval(k, α) = “Yes”. The base case: Let q = C(a) where C ∈ CΣ,S . Then, by Lemma 4.4.2,
C(a) ∈ LE(k). By Lines 1 and 2 in Figure 4.7, the claim follows immediately. Next, let
q = C(a) where C 6∈ CΣ,S .
- q = CuD(a). To answer this query the algorithm computes Eval(k,C(a)) and Eval(k,D(a)).
Now, the assumption (MET , k) |= C uD(a) implies (MET , k) |= C(a) and (MET , k) |= D(a)
which, by inductive hypothesis, implies that Eval(k,C(a)) = Eval(k,D(a)) = “Yes”.
Hence, by Lines 4 and 5 in Figure 4.7, Eval(k,C uD(a)) = “Yes”.
- q = ∃r.C(a). By the assumption, (MET , k) |= ∃r.C(a). This implies that, for some
d ∈ O∗, (MET , k) |= r(a, d) and (MET , k) |= C(d). By Theorem 4.3.1, r(a, d) ∈ LE(k) and
by the inductive hypothesis Eval(k,C(d))=“Yes”. Hence, by the Lines 9 and 10 in Figure
4.7, Eval(k, ∃r.C(a))= “Yes”.
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- q = ♦C(a). Then, (MET , k) |= ♦C(a). This implies that, for some l ∈ E(k), (MET , l) |=
C(a). By Definition 4.3.4, (k, l) ∈ E and therefore l ∈ E(k). By the inductive hypothesis
Eval(l, C(a)) = “Yes”. Hence, by the Lines 14 and 15 in Figure 4.7, Eval(k,♦C(a))=
“Yes”. 
Given an assertional query q, the algorithm given in Figure 4.7 checks for some assertions
related to query q in the labeling sets of nodes along a particular path in TE . Since the size
of each labeling set is bounded by | Σ | + | CΣ,S |, by the Claim 1, this algorithm runs in
time polynomial in | Σ | + | CΣ,S |. Hence the assertional query answering can be done in
polynomial time in the size of | Σ | + | CΣ,S |.
Example 4.5.1. (example 4.4.1 cont.) Recall that TE is a secrecy-preserving tree. Suppose
that the querying agent asks the assertional queries ∃u.C(a), ♦♦∃v.F (d) and ♦A(a) . Using
the algorithm in Figure 4.7, we get the following answers:
q Eval(k, q) Remarks
∃u.C(a) Yes by Lines 1 and 2
♦♦∃v.F (d) Yes by Lines 14, 15, 9 and 1
♦A(a) Unknown by Lines 14 and 17 
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the problem of secrecy-preserving query answering over
ELH♦ KBs. We have used the conceptual logic-based framework for secrecy-preserving rea-
soning which was introduced by Tao et al., see Tao et al. (2014), to a description logic ELH
augmented with a modal operator ♦. The main contribution is in the way that we compute
the consequences and preserve secrecy while answering queries. We break the process into two
parts, the first one using the ♦-assertions in the KB, precomputes the rooted labeled tree T
and the envelope E for the given secrecy set S. For this we use two separate (but related)
tableau procedures. In query answering step, given T and E, we define the secrecy-preserving
tree TE . Once TE has been computed, the query answering procedure is efficient and can be
implemented in polynomial time.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The main focus of this dissertation is to study the problem of SPQA with single querying
agent in lightweight DLs DL-LiteR, and ELH and its extension ELH♦. The main steps involved
in the construction of SPQA system are (1) computing all or some of the consequences of the
given KB by designing suitable tableau algorithms, (2) computing the envelopes for the given
secrecy sets by designing tableau style procedures based on the idea of inverting the rules in
tableau algorithms and (3) answering queries as informatively as possible without revealing
the secrets in the secrecy sets. For each language, we used a different strategy to design
procedures to compute the consequences of the KB, envelopes and query answering steps. We
also considered different types of statements like assertional, GCI and BCQ in the secrecy sets.
Important contributions in this work are listed in the following:
• In Chapter 2, we studied the problem of SPQA over acyclic DL-LiteR KBs with BCQs
in the secrecy set. A tableau algorithm was designed to compute consequences of a KB.
Some rules in the tableau algorithm are able to compute negative assertions entailed by
the KB. To show the tableau algorithm sound and complete, we used the semantics based
on Kleene’s 3-valued logic. We provided syntactic characterizations for entailment and
disentailment of BCQs in terms of properties of mappings. In the envelope computation
step, since BCQs are not the part of DL-LiteR syntax, we designed two special rules
to protect BCQs in the secrecy set. Graph matching technique was used to answer the
BCQs.
• In Chapter 3, we considered the DL ELH to study the SPQA problem with assertions
and GCIs as secrets. The important contribution in this work was the way in which we
compute the consequences and preserve secrecy while answering queries. The idea is to
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break the process into two parts, first one precomputes all the consequences for concepts
and individuals that occur in the given KB. Two tableau algorithms were designed to
compute the consequences. Based on the rules in these two algorithms, we designed two
more tableau style algorithms to compute the corresponding envelopes. In the query
answering step, the queries were parsed all the way to constituents that occur in the
previously precomputed set of consequences. Then, the queries were answered based
on the membership of the constituents of the query in A∗ \ EA and T ∗ \ ET . All the
algorithms are efficient and can be implemented in polynomial time.
• In chapter 4, we studied the problem of secrecy-preserving query answering over ELH♦
KBs. We used the conceptual logic-based framework for secrecy-preserving reasoning to a
description logic ELH augmented with a modal operator ♦. In the first step, to compute
a set of consequences of ELH♦ KB, we designed a tableau algorithm to construct a rooted
labeled tree T whose root node have the labeling set which contains the consequences of
the KB. Given the computed tree T and the secrecy set S, we next computed an envelope
E for the secrecy set. In query answering step, given T and E, we defined the secrecy-
preserving tree TE . Since TE does not contain all the consequences of the given KB, the
information available in TE is not sufficient to answer queries correctly. To fix this issue,
we designed an inductive algorithm to answer queries by breaking the queries all the way
to constituents that are available in TE . Given TE , the query answering procedure is
efficient and can be implemented in polynomial time.
We conclude this dissertation by mentioning some of the future work that we intend to
pursue. We would like to study this SPQA problem in probabilistic DLs Lutz and Schroder
(2010); Gutierrez-Basulto et al. (2012) and temporal DLs Gutierrez-Basulto et al. (2012). We
also would like to extend SPQA problem that we studied in this dissertation to multiagents
settings similar to Tao et al. (2014).
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
A.1 Additional Material for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
Lemma 2.3.1 (Soundness of Λ, Part A) Let A∗12 be a completed ABox obtained from Σ by first
applying the rules listed in Figure 1 and then the rules of Figure 2. Then for every OW-model
I of Σ, there is a OW-model I∗12 of Σ such that I∗12 |= A∗12, where the domain of I∗12 is same as
the domain of I and I∗12 remains same as I except for the interpretation of fresh individuals.
Proof. Let I = 〈∆, ·I〉 be an arbitrary OW-model of Σ. It suffices to show that after applying
each expansion rule, there is an OW-model of Σ that satisfies the new assertions being added
to A∗ by that rule and that differs from (possibly) original interpretation only on how it
interprets the new fresh individuals. The proof is by induction on the construction of A∗. For
the induction step, we use A′ (A′′), O′ (O′′) and I ′ =
〈
∆, ·I′
〉
(I ′′ =
〈
∆, ·I′′
〉
) to denote the
ABox, the set of individual names appearing in the ABox, and the model of the ABox (and the
TBox), respectively, before (after) the application of an expansion rule. The OW-model at the
termination of this stage (when no more applications of rules in Figures 1 and 2 are possible) is
denoted by I∗12. The base case is before any expansion rules have been applied in which case,
A∗ = A and we can take I ′ = I ′′ = I. There are seven cases (the number of rules in Figures 1
and 2, all rather simple).
- If vNL-rule is applicable, then A(a) ∈ A′, A v L ∈ T and L(a) ∈ A′′. By induction
hypothesis, I ′ |= A(a), hence aI′ ∈ AI′Y ⊆ LI
′
Y . Let I ′′ = I ′. Then, aI
′′
= aI′ ∈ LI′Y =
LI′′Y . Hence, I ′′ |= L(a).
- If vN∃-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We consider
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the latter case, the first one being easier. By assumption, A(a) ∈ A′, A v ∃P− ∈ T ,
P (c, a) ∈ A′′ where c is fresh, and O′′ = O′ ∪ {c}. By induction hypothesis I ′ |= A(a),
hence aI′ ∈ AI′Y ⊆ (∃P−)I
′
Y . This implies (d, a
I′) ∈ P I′Y for some d ∈ ∆. Let I ′′ be
same as I ′ except redefine cI′′ = d. Then, (cI′′ , aI′′) = (d, aI′) ∈ P I′Y = P I
′′
Y . Hence,
I ′′ |= P (c, a).
- If v∃L-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We argue the
latter case. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A′, ∃P− v L ∈ T and L(a) ∈ A′′. By induction
hypothesis, I ′ |= P (b, a) ⇒ (bI′ , aI′) ∈ P I′Y ⇒ (aI
′
, bI′) ∈ (P−)I′Y ⇒ aI
′ ∈ (∃P−)I′Y ⇒
aI′ ∈ LI′Y . Let I ′′ = I ′. Then, aI
′′
= aI′ ∈ LI′Y = LI
′′
Y . Hence, I ′′ |= L(a).
- If v∃∃-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−, (iii)
R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider the case (iv), the other cases can
be argued similarly. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A′, ∃P− v ∃Q− ∈ T and Q(c, a) ∈ A′′,
where c is fresh, and O′′ = O′ ∪ {c}. By induction hypothesis, I ′ |= P (b, a), hence
(bI′ , aI′) ∈ P I′Y . That is, (aI
′
, bI′) ∈ (P−)I′Y ⇒ aI
′ ∈ (∃P−)I′Y ⇒ aI
′ ∈ (∃Q−)I′Y . This
implies (d, aI′) ∈ QI′Y for some d ∈ ∆. Let I ′′ be same as I ′ except redefine cI
′′
= d.
Then, (cI′′ , aI′′) = (d, aI′) ∈ QI′Y = QI
′′
Y . Hence, I ′′ |= Q(c, a).
- If vRE-rule is applicable, we have eight cases (i) R = P,E = Q, (ii) R = P,E = Q−, (iii)
R = P−, E = Q, (iv) R = P−, E = Q−, (v) R = P,E = ¬Q, (vi) R = P,E = ¬Q−, (vii)
R = P−, E = ¬Q and (viii) R = P−, E = ¬Q−. We consider the case (viii), the other
cases being easier. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A′, P− v ¬Q− ∈ T and ¬Q(b, a) ∈ A′′. By
induction hypothesis, I ′ |= P (b, a), hence (bI′ , aI′) ∈ P I′Y . That is, (aI
′
, bI′) ∈ (P−)I′Y ⇒
(aI′ , bI′) ∈ (¬Q−)I′Y ⇒ (aI
′
, bI′) ∈ (Q−)I′N . This implies (bI
′
, aI′) ∈ QI′N . Let I ′′ = I ′.
Then, (bI′′ , aI′′) = (bI′ , aI′) ∈ QI′N = QI
′′
N . Hence, I ′′ |= ¬Q(b, a).
- If vN@-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We consider
the latter case, the first one being easier. By assumption, A(a) ∈ A′, A v ¬∃P− ∈ T ,
and ¬P (c, a) ∈ A′′ for every c ∈ O′ = O′′. By induction hypothesis, I ′ |= A(a), hence
aI′ ∈ AI′Y ⊆ (¬∃P−)I
′
Y = (∃P−)I
′
N . This implies (d, a
I′) ∈ P I′N for every d ∈ ∆. Let I ′′ be
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same as I ′. Then, for every c ∈ O′′, (cI′′ , aI′′) = (cI′ , aI′) ∈ (¬P )I′Y = (¬P )I
′′
Y . Hence,
for every c ∈ O′′, I ′′ |= ¬P (c, a).
- If v∃@-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−, (iii)
R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider the case (iv), the other cases can
be argued similarly. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A′, ∃P− v ¬∃Q− ∈ T and ¬Q(c, a) ∈ A′′,
for every c ∈ O′ = O′′. By induction hypothesis, I ′ |= P (b, a), hence (bI′ , aI′) ∈ P I′Y .
That is, (aI′ , bI′) ∈ (P−)I′Y ⇒ aI
′ ∈ (∃P−)I′Y ⇒ aI
′ ∈ (¬∃Q−)I′Y = (∃Q−)I
′
N . This
implies (d, aI′) ∈ QI′N for every d ∈ ∆. Let I ′′ be same as I ′. Then, for every c ∈ O′′,
(cI′′ , aI′′) = (cI′ , aI′) ∈ QI′N = (¬Q)I
′
Y = (¬Q)I
′′
Y . Hence, for every c ∈ O′′, I ′′ |= ¬Q(c, a).
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3.2
Lemma 2.3.2 (Soundness of Λ, Part B) Let A∗ be a completed ABox obtained from A∗12 by
applying the rules listed in Figure 3. For any OW-model I of Σ, let I∗ = 〈∆∗, ·I∗〉 be an
OW-interpretation as defined above. Then, I∗ is an OW-model of Σ and I∗ |= A∗.
Proof. Let I = 〈∆, ·I〉 be a OW-model of Σ. Then, by Lemma 2.3.1, I∗12 is an OW-model of
〈A∗12, T 〉 and by Corollary 2.3.1, I∗ =
〈
∆∗, ·I∗〉 is also a OW-model of 〈A∗12, T 〉 and hence a
model of Σ. To prove the entailment it suffices to show that after applying each expansion rule
in Figure 3, I∗ satisfies the new assertions being added to A∗. The proof is by induction on the
construction of A∗. The base case is before any expansion rules in Figure 3 have been applied.
In this case, A∗ = A∗12 and, by Corollary 2.3.1, I∗ satisfies A∗. For the induction step, we use
A′ (A′′) to denote the ABox, before (after) the application of an expansion rule.
- If vNL¬-rule is applicable, then ¬L(a) ∈ A′, A v L ∈ T and ¬A(a) ∈ A′′. By induction
hypothesis, I∗ |= ¬L(a), hence aI∗ ∈ (¬L)I∗Y = LI
∗
N ⊆ AI
∗
N . Hence, I∗ |= ¬A(a).
- If vN∃¬-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We consider
the latter case, the first one being easier. By assumption, ∀b ∈ O∗ [¬P (b, a) ∈ A′],
A v ∃P ∈ T and ¬A(a) ∈ A′′. By induction hypothesis, I∗ |= ¬P (a, b), for every b ∈ O∗
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⇒ ∀d ∈ ∆∗ [(aI∗ , d) ∈ (¬P )I∗Y = P I
∗
N ] ⇒ aI
∗ ∈ (∃P )I∗N . Hence aI
∗ ∈ (∃P )I∗N ⊆ AI
∗
N .
Therefore, I∗ |= ¬A(a).
- If vRE¬-rule is applicable, we have eight cases (i) R = P,E = Q, (ii) R = P,E = Q−, (iii)
R = P−, E = Q, (iv) R = P−, E = Q−, (v) R = P,E = ¬Q, (vi) R = P,E = ¬Q−, (vii)
R = P−, E = ¬Q and (viii) R = P−, E = ¬Q−. We consider the case (viii), the other
cases being easier. By assumption, Q(b, a) ∈ A′, P− v ¬Q− ∈ T and ¬P (b, a) ∈ A′′.
By induction hypothesis, I∗ |= Q(b, a), hence (bI∗ , aI∗) ∈ QI∗Y . That is, (aI
∗
, bI∗) ∈
(Q−)I∗Y = (¬Q−)I
∗
N ⊆ (P−)I
∗
N This implies (b
I∗ , aI∗) ∈ P I∗N . Hence, I∗ |= ¬P (b, a).
- If vN@¬-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We argue the
latter case. By assumption, P (b, a) ∈ A′, A v ¬∃P− ∈ T and ¬A(a) ∈ A′′. By induction
hypothesis, I∗ |= P (b, a) ⇒ (bI∗ , aI∗) ∈ P I∗Y ⇒ aI
∗ ∈ (∃P−)I∗Y ⇒ aI
∗ ∈ AI∗N . Hence,
I∗ |= ¬A(a).
- If v∃L¬-rule is applicable, we have two cases (i) R = P , and (ii) R = P−. We consider
the latter case. By assumption, ¬L(a) ∈ A′, ∃P− v L ∈ T and ¬P (b, a) ∈ A′′ for every
b ∈ O∗. By induction hypothesis, I∗ |= ¬L(a), hence aI∗ ∈ (¬L)I∗Y = LI
∗
N ⊆ (∃P−)I
∗
N .
This implies, (d, aI∗) ∈ P I∗N for every d ∈ ∆∗. Hence, for every b ∈ O∗, (bI
∗
, aI∗) ∈
(¬P )I∗Y and so for every b ∈ O∗, I∗ |= ¬P (b, a).
- If v∃∃¬-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−,
(iii) R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider the case (iv), the other
cases can be argued similarly. By assumption, ∀b ∈ O∗ [¬Q(b, a) ∈ A′], ∃P− v ∃Q− ∈ T
and ¬P (c, a) ∈ A′′, for some c ∈ O∗. By induction hypothesis, I∗ |= ¬Q(b, a), for
every b ∈ O∗ ⇒ ∀d ∈ ∆∗[(d, aI∗) ∈ (¬Q)I∗Y = (Q)I
∗
N ] ⇒ aI
∗ ∈ (∃Q−)I∗N . Hence,
aI∗ ∈ (∃Q−)I∗N ⊆ (∃P−)I
∗
N . This implies, (d, a
I∗) ∈ (P )I∗N for all d ∈ ∆∗. Then, for
every c ∈ O∗, (cI∗ , aI∗) ∈ (¬P )I∗Y . Hence, for every c ∈ O∗, I∗ |= ¬P (c, a).
- If v∃@¬-rule is applicable, we have four cases (i) R = P, S = Q, (ii) R = P, S = Q−, (iii)
R = P−, S = Q and (iv) R = P−, S = Q−. We consider the case (iv), the other cases
can be argued similarly. By assumption, Q(b, a) ∈ A′, ∃P− v ¬∃Q− ∈ T and ¬P (c, a) ∈
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A′′, for every c ∈ O∗. By induction hypothesis, I∗ = Q(b, a) ⇒ (bI∗ , aI∗) ∈ QI∗Y ⇒
(aI∗ , bI∗) ∈ (Q−)I∗Y ⇒ aI
∗ ∈ (∃Q−)I∗Y . Hence, aI
∗ ∈ (∃Q−)I∗Y ⊆ (∃P−)I
∗
N . This implies
(d, aI∗) ∈ P I∗N for every d ∈ ∆∗. Then, for every c ∈ O∗, (cI
∗
, aI∗) ∈ P I∗N = (¬P )I
∗
Y .
Hence, for every c ∈ O∗, I∗ |= ¬P (c, a).
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3.3
Lemma 2.3.3 Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a DL-LiteR KB. Then ∀α ∈ A ∪ T , J |= α.
Proof. First we consider an assertion α ∈ A. There are four cases:
- α = A(a) ∈ A. Then, A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ aJ = a ∈ AJY ⇒ J |= A(a),
- α = ¬A(a) ∈ A. Then, ¬A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ aJ = a ∈ AJN ⇒ J |= ¬A(a),
- α = P (a, b) ∈ A. Then, P (a, b) ∈ A∗ ⇒ (aJ , bJ ) = (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ J |= P (a, b) and
- α = ¬P (a, b) ∈ A. Then, ¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗ ⇒ (aJ , bJ ) = (a, b) ∈ PJN ⇒ J |= ¬P (a, b).
Next we consider subsumptions in T . We recall that for each subsumption E v F ∈ T , we
must show that EJY ⊆ FJY and FJN ⊆ EJN . In the following we shall use, without mention, the
fact that A∗ is completed. We also recall that for any B ∈ NC , (¬B)JY = BJN and (¬B)JN = BJY .
There are several cases.
- α = A v L and let D ∈ NC . There are two sub-cases.
- case 1: L = D. Then, a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ D(a) ∈ A∗(vNL − rule)⇒ a ∈ DJY .
Similarly, a ∈ DJN ⇒ ¬D(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗(vNL¬ − rule)
⇒ a ∈ AJN .
- case 2: L = ¬D. Then, a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬D(a) ∈ A∗(vNL − rule) ⇒ a ∈
DJN ⇒ a ∈ (¬D)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (¬D)JN ⇒ a ∈ DJY ⇒ D(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈
A∗(vNL¬ − rule)⇒ a ∈ AJN .
- α = A v ∃R and let P ∈ NR. There are two sub-cases.
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- case 1: R = P . Then, a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ P (a, b) ∈ A∗(vN∃ − rule), where b
is fresh ⇒ (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ a ∈ (∃P )JY . Similarly, a ∈ (∃P )JN
⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJN ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗,¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗(vN∃¬ − rule) ⇒
a ∈ AJN .
- case 2 : R = P−. Then, a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ P (b, a) ∈ A∗(vN∃ − rule), where
b is fresh ⇒ (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒ a ∈ (∃P−)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (∃P−)JN
⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ PJN ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗,¬P (b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗(vN∃¬ − rule) ⇒
a ∈ AJN .
- α = ∃R v L. There are four sub-cases (R = P,L = A), (R = P−, L = A), (R = P,L =
¬A) and (R = P−, L = ¬A), where A ∈ NC , P ∈ NR. We shall prove only two sub-cases,
The other two sub-cases can be proved similarly.
- case 1: R = P and L = A. Then, a ∈ (∃P )JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (a, b) ∈
A∗ ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗(v∃L − rule)⇒ a ∈ AJY . Similarly, a ∈ AJN ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀b ∈
O∗,¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗(v∃L¬ − rule)⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P )JN .
- case 2: R = P− and L = ¬A. Then, a ∈ (∃P−)JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒
P (b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗(v∃L − rule) ⇒ a ∈ (¬A)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (¬A)JN ⇒
a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗,¬P (b, a) ∈ A∗(v∃L¬ − rule) ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈
PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P−)JN .
- α = ∃R v ∃S. There are four sub-cases (R = P, S = Q), (R = P−, S = Q), (R = P, S =
Q−) and (R = P−, S = Q−), where P,Q ∈ NR. Here we shall prove only two sub-cases.
The others can be proved similarly.
- case 1: R = P and S = Q−. Then, a ∈ (∃P )JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (a, b) ∈
A∗ ⇒ Q(c, a) ∈ A∗(v∃∃ − rule), c is fresh ⇒ (c, a) ∈ QJY ⇒ (a, c) ∈ (Q−)JY ⇒ a ∈
(∃Q−)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (∃Q−)JN ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ QJN ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗,¬Q(b, a) ∈
A∗ ⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,¬P (a, c) ∈ A∗(v∃∃¬ − rule)⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗, (a, c) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P )JN .
- case 2: R = P− and S = Q−. Then, a ∈ (∃P−)JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒
P (b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ Q(c, a) ∈ A∗(v∃∃ − rule), c is fresh ⇒ (c, a) ∈ QJY ⇒ (a, c) ∈
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(Q−)JY ⇒ a ∈ (∃Q−)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (∃Q−)JN ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ QJN ⇒ ∀b ∈
O∗,¬Q(b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,¬P (c, a) ∈ A∗
(v∃∃¬ − rule)⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗, (c, a) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P−)JN .
- α = R v E. There are eight sub-cases (R = P,E = Q), (R = P−, E = Q), (R =
P,E = Q−), (R = P−, E = Q−), (R = P,E = ¬Q), (R = P−, E = ¬Q), (R = P,E =
¬Q−) and (R = P−, E = ¬Q−), where P,Q ∈ NR. We argue only three of these.
- case 1: R = P and E = Q−. Then, (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (a, b) ∈ A∗ ⇒ Q(b, a) ∈
A∗(vRE − rule) ⇒ (b, a) ∈ QJY ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (Q−)JY . Similarly, (a, b) ∈ (Q−)JN ⇒
(b, a) ∈ QJN ⇒ ¬Q(b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬P (a, b) ∈ A∗(vRE¬ − rule)⇒ (a, b) ∈ PJN .
- case 2: R = P− and E = ¬Q. Then, (a, b) ∈ (P−)JY ⇒ (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (b, a) ∈
A∗ ⇒ ¬Q(a, b) ∈ A∗(vRE − rule)⇒ (a, b) ∈ QJN ⇒ (a, b) ∈
(¬Q)JY . Similarly, (a, b) ∈ (¬Q)JN ⇒ (a, b) ∈ QJY ⇒ Q(a, b) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬P (b, a) ∈
A∗(vRE¬ − rule)⇒ (b, a) ∈ PJN ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (P−)JN .
- case 3: R = ¬P− and E = ¬Q−. Then, (a, b) ∈ (¬P−)JY ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (P−)JN ⇒
(b, a) ∈ PJN ⇒ ¬P (b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬Q(b, a) ∈ A∗(vRE − rule) ⇒ (b, a) ∈ QJN ⇒
(a, b) ∈ (Q−)JN ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (¬Q−)JY . Similarly, (a, b) ∈ (¬Q−)JN ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (Q−)JY ⇒
(b, a) ∈ QJY ⇒ Q(b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ P (b, a) ∈ A∗(vRE¬ − rule)⇒ (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒ (a, b) ∈
(P−)JY ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (¬P−)JN .
- α = A v ¬∃R. There are two sub-cases.
- case 1: R = P , where P ∈ NR. Then, a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗,¬P (a, b) ∈
A∗(vN@ − rule) ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P )JN ⇒ a ∈ (¬∃P )JY . Similarly,
a ∈ (¬∃P )JN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P )JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (a, b) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈
A∗(vN@¬ − rule)⇒ a ∈ AJN .
- case 2 : R = P−. Then, a ∈ AJY ⇒ A(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗,¬P (b, a) ∈ A∗(vN@ −
rule) ⇒ ∀b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P−)JN ⇒ a ∈ (¬∃P−)JY . Similarly,
a ∈ (¬∃P−)JN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P−)JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (b, a)
∈ A∗ ⇒ ¬A(a) ∈ A∗(vN@¬ − rule)⇒ a ∈ AJN .
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- α = ∃R v ¬∃S. There are four sub-cases (R = P, S = Q), (R = P−, S = Q), (R = P, S =
Q−) and (R = P−, S = Q−), where P,Q ∈ NR. We shall prove only two sub-cases; other
two sub-cases can be proved similarly.
- case 1: R = P and S = Q−. Then, a ∈ (∃P )JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (a, b) ∈ PJY ⇒ P (a, b) ∈
A∗ ⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,¬Q(c, a) ∈ A∗(v∃@− rule)⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗, (c, a) ∈ QJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃Q−)JN ⇒
a ∈ (¬∃Q−)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (¬∃Q−)JN ⇒ a ∈ (∃Q−)JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ QJY ⇒
Q(b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,¬P (a, c) ∈ A∗(v∃@¬ − rule)⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗, (a, c) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈
(∃P )JN .
- case 2: R = P− and S = Q−. Then, a ∈ (∃P−)JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ PJY ⇒
P (b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,¬Q(c, a) ∈ A∗(v∃@ − rule)⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,
(c, a) ∈ QJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃Q−)JN ⇒ a ∈ (¬∃Q−)JY . Similarly, a ∈ (¬∃Q−)JN ⇒ a ∈
(∃Q−)JY ⇒ ∃b ∈ O∗, (b, a) ∈ QJY ⇒ Q(b, a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗,¬P (c, a)
∈ A∗(v∃@¬ − rule)⇒ ∀c ∈ O∗, (c, a) ∈ PJN ⇒ a ∈ (∃P−)JN .
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